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Abstract	  	  	   Dynamic	  psychiatry—that	  is,	  the	  model	  of	  psychiatry	  grounded	  in	  Freudian	  psychoanalysis—was	  the	  dominant	  mode	  in	  American	  psychiatry	  from	  World	  War	  II	  until	  around	  the	  late	  1970s.	  Most	  psychiatric	  departments	  were	  headed	  by	  dynamic	  psychiatrists,	  and	  psychiatry	  residents,	  even	  those	  who	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  become	  psychoanalysts,	  received	  training	  in	  psychoanalytic	  concepts	  as	  part	  of	  their	  basic	  education.	  Furthermore,	  dynamic	  psychiatrists	  expanded	  psychiatric	  treatment	  to	  include	  all	  types	  of	  mental	  distress	  except	  schizophrenia	  and	  bipolar	  disorder—and	  sometimes	  even	  those.	  By	  the	  1980s,	  though,	  dynamic	  psychiatry’s	  fortunes	  had	  changed.	  Dynamic	  psychiatry	  was	  abandoned	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  “diagnostic”	  model,	  which	  viewed	  mental	  distress	  as	  a	  group	  of	  discrete	  medical	  illnesses.	  Psychoanalysis	  was	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  unscientific,	  and	  dynamic	  psychiatrists	  no	  longer	  had	  the	  same	  presence	  in	  the	  faculty	  of	  medical	  schools	  and	  hospitals.	  Why	  did	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  fall	  from	  its	  position	  as	  the	  most	  influential	  model	  in	  American	  psychiatry,	  and	  why	  did	  it	  fall	  so	  fast?	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  argue	  that	  psychiatry	  as	  a	  whole,	  a	  branch	  of	  medicine	  that	  was	  under	  intense	  scrutiny	  from	  both	  the	  lay	  public	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  medical	  world,	  was	  under	  pressure	  to	  prove	  its	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  science	  and	  as	  medicine.	  And	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  its	  scientific	  authority,	  psychiatry	  needed	  to	  prove	  that	  it	  was	  capable	  of	  generating	  scientific	  knowledge.	  Dynamic	  psychiatry	  struggled	  to	  do	  this,	  and	  certainly	  did	  not	  do	  it	  as	  well	  as	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  and	  other	  models.	  Thus,	  because	  psychoanalysis	  was	  not	  useful	  for	  solving	  the	  political	  problems	  of	  American	  psychiatry	  as	  an	  institution,	  it	  fell	  out	  of	  favor	  in	  psychiatry	  as	  a	  science.	  	  To	  argue	  this	  point,	  I	  examine	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  either	  did	  not	  or	  could	  not	  produce	  scientific	  knowledge.	  In	  my	  first	  chapter,	  I	  examine	  the	  uncontrolled	  growth	  of	  competing	  theories	  and	  schools	  of	  thought	  in	  psychoanalysis	  to	  show	  how,	  even	  when	  seemingly	  producing	  knowledge	  prolifically,	  psychoanalysis	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  highly	  fractured	  field	  that	  was	  incapable	  of	  testing	  or	  sorting	  through	  newly	  produced	  ideas.	  I	  also	  examine	  how	  dynamic	  psychiatry,	  unlike	  other	  sciences,	  was	  stunted	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  innovate	  freely	  due	  to	  the	  inescapable	  influence	  of	  its	  founder,	  Freud.	  In	  my	  second	  chapter,	  I	  examine	  how	  changing	  notions	  of	  scientific	  objectivity	  during	  this	  time	  tarnished	  the	  standing	  of	  psychoanalytic	  knowledge,	  which	  lacked	  the	  labels	  of	  “scientific”	  and	  “empirical.”	  In	  my	  third	  chapter,	  to	  argue	  my	  point	  that	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  fell	  out	  of	  favor	  because	  it	  was	  unable	  to	  produce	  scientific	  knowledge,	  I	  show	  how	  the	  model	  that	  replaced	  it,	  diagnostic	  psychiatry,	  facilitated	  the	  production	  of	  knowledge	  very	  well.	  Since	  Foucault’s	  revolutionary	  work	  on	  the	  mutually	  reinforcing	  relationship	  of	  power	  and	  knowledge,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  great	  body	  of	  scholarship	  furthering	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  intersection	  of	  the	  two.	  However,	  most	  of	  the	  scholarship	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  power/knowledge	  (including	  Foucault’s)	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  way	  that	  knowledge	  of	  a	  particular	  person	  helps	  one	  gain	  power	  over	  that	  person	  (as	  seen	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  doctor	  and	  the	  patient,	  the	  state	  and	  the	  prisoner,	  etc).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  case	  of	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  shows	  that,	  in	  the	  sciences	  at	  least,	  the	  production	  of	  knowledge	  itself—regardless	  of	  its	  relationship	  to	  its	  subject—functions	  as	  both	  a	  prerequisite	  and	  source	  of	  authority.	  Thus,	  the	  fall	  of	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  demonstrates	  both	  the	  pressure	  on	  science	  to	  produce	  knowledge	  and	  how	  social	  and	  political	  factors	  often	  underlie	  scientific	  change	  and	  progress.	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1	  
INTRODUCTION	  
A	  Field	  in	  Decline	  Freud’s	  1909	  lectures	  at	  Clark	  University,	  which	  occurred	  during	  his	  first	  and	  only	  visit	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  sowed	  the	  seeds	  for	  psychoanalysis’	  dominance	  in	  American	  psychiatry	  for	  the	  middle	  part	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  quick	  success	  of	  Freud’s	  ideas	  in	  America	  was	  due	  partly	  to	  strategy	  and	  partly	  to	  serendipity:	  strategy,	  in	  that	  Freud	  presented	  his	  ideas	  as	  simplistically	  and	  optimistically	  as	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  well-­‐known	  pragmatism	  of	  the	  Americans;	  serendipity,	  in	  that	  Freud’s	  theories	  blamed	  sexual	  repression	  as	  a	  prime	  cause	  of	  neuroses	  at	  a	  time	  when	  Americans	  were	  fiercely	  engaged	  with	  changing	  sexual	  mores.1	  As	  sociologist	  Michael	  Strand	  notes,	  though,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  in	  psychoanalysis’	  success	  in	  America	  is	  that	  psychoanalysis	  offered	  the	  possibility	  of	  establishing	  an	  etiology	  for	  “everyday”	  mental	  distress,	  or	  at	  least	  mental	  distress	  less	  severe	  than	  the	  extreme	  mental	  illness	  of	  asylum	  patients;	  thus,	  American	  psychiatry	  found	  just	  the	  tool	  it	  needed	  to	  shift	  from	  its	  “lowly	  duty	  of	  managing	  the	  insane”	  in	  asylums	  to	  a	  much	  larger	  role	  in	  regulating	  mental	  health	  in	  the	  United	  States.2	  This	  “shift	  from	  the	  asylum	  to	  the	  office,”	  as	  historian	  Allen	  Horwitz	  puts	  it,	  is	  well-­‐supported	  by	  the	  statistics:	  in	  1917,	  the	  proportion	  of	  American	  psychiatrists	  in	  private	  practice	  was	  8	  percent;	  by	  1941,	  it	  had	  risen	  to	  38	  percent;	  in	  1970,	  it	  reached	  66	  percent.3	  	  Psychoanalysis	  also	  rose	  to	  influence	  in	  training	  centers	  and	  academic	  positions:	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  psychoanalysts	  chaired	  58	  percent	  of	  all	  psychiatry	  departments	  in	  the	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United	  States,	  and	  in	  1954,	  a	  study	  of	  fourteen	  psychiatric	  resident	  training	  centers	  discovered	  that	  most	  of	  the	  training	  centers	  were	  psychoanalytically	  oriented,	  and	  that	  individual	  residents	  were	  likely	  to	  be	  psychoanalytically	  oriented	  even	  when	  their	  training	  center	  was	  not.4	  	  	   However,	  despite	  psychoanalysis’	  dominance	  in	  psychiatry	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  its	  popularity	  in	  psychiatry	  suddenly	  declined	  as	  rapidly	  as	  it	  had	  risen.	  At	  UCLA,	  for	  instance,	  the	  percentage	  of	  psychiatric	  residents	  in	  psychoanalytic	  training	  centers	  in	  1966	  was	  50	  percent;	  by	  1975,	  it	  had	  already	  dropped	  to	  27	  percent,	  almost	  half	  that	  number.5	  Today,	  there	  are	  virtually	  no	  psychiatry	  departments	  headed	  by	  psychoanalytic	  psychiatrists.6	  What	  was	  it	  that	  led	  to	  the	  death	  of	  psychoanalytic	  psychiatry	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s?	  	   Some	  authors,	  such	  as	  Robert	  Whitaker,	  argue	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  handful	  of	  new	  psychopharmacological	  medications	  raised	  hopes	  for	  a	  “magic	  bullet”	  for	  various	  psychiatric	  conditions,	  and	  the	  demonstrable	  initial	  success	  of	  these	  medications	  spurred	  a	  “biological	  revolution”	  in	  psychiatry	  that	  was	  comparable	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  penicillin	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  medicine.7,8	  This	  new	  biological	  perspective,	  it	  is	  argued,	  initiated	  the	  movement	  away	  from	  the	  neuroses	  of	  the	  dynamic	  model	  (that	  is,	  the	  model	  of	  psychiatric	  practice	  grounded	  in	  the	  tenets	  of	  psychoanalysis),	  which	  were	  held	  to	  be	  inseparable	  and	  continuous	  with	  normal	  mental	  life,	  and	  towards	  its	  successor,	  the	  diagnostic	  model,	  where	  mental	  illness	  was	  conceived	  as	  a	  series	  of	  discrete	  medical	  illnesses.	  The	  growing	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attention	  to	  biology	  in	  psychiatry,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  effects	  of	  this	  attention	  on	  society’s	  conception	  of	  human	  mental	  life	  and	  human	  subjectivity,	  is	  an	  important	  topic	  worthy	  of	  critical	  attention.	  However,	  it	  alone	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  historical	  shift	  from	  the	  dynamic	  model	  to	  the	  diagnostic	  model,	  because	  while	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  conceived	  of	  mental	  distress	  as	  composed	  of	  a	  series	  of	  separate	  illnesses,	  the	  individual	  medications	  produced	  by	  the	  biological	  approach	  typically	  proved	  effective	  in	  treating	  many	  of	  these	  supposedly	  different	  illnesses	  at	  once.9	  That	  is,	  while	  American	  psychiatry	  increasingly	  thought	  of	  mental	  distress	  in	  terms	  of	  discrete	  and	  distinguishable	  syndromes,	  pharmaceuticals	  did	  not.	  By	  extension,	  the	  growth	  in	  popularity	  of	  the	  biological	  approach	  to	  psychiatry	  cannot	  alone	  explain	  why	  the	  dynamic	  model	  was	  abandoned	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  model.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  argue	  instead	  that	  American	  psychiatry	  abandoned	  psychoanalysis	  during	  this	  time	  because	  psychoanalysis	  increasingly	  appeared	  to	  both	  laymen	  and	  scientists	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  generate	  scientific	  knowledge,	  and	  that	  psychiatry,	  a	  relatively	  new	  and	  increasingly	  controversial	  branch	  of	  medicine	  and	  science,	  needed	  to	  demonstrate	  publicly	  that	  it	  was	  capable	  of	  producing	  knowledge	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  authority	  and	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  medicine	  and	  with	  the	  public.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  its	  decline,	  psychoanalysis	  appeared	  stagnant,	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  its	  methods	  had	  been	  called	  into	  question;	  psychiatry	  needed	  other	  tools	  by	  which	  to	  carve	  out	  a	  niche	  for	  itself	  in	  science	  and	  medicine.	  Therefore,	  I	  will	  examine	  psychoanalysis	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  changing	  practices	  of	  science	  and	  scientific	  research	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  identify	  the	  sociohistorical	  factors	  that	  led	  American	  psychiatrists	  to	  turn	  to	  other	  models	  of	  psychiatry	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  hope	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  cultural	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pressures	  on	  scientific	  disciplines	  to	  produce	  scientific	  knowledge,	  even	  as	  the	  societies	  within	  which	  they	  operate	  change	  what	  qualifies	  as	  knowledge	  over	  time.	  	   In	  my	  first	  chapter,	  I	  will	  substantiate	  and	  expand	  upon	  my	  claim	  that	  psychoanalysis	  failed	  to	  grow	  as	  a	  science	  and	  discipline	  since	  its	  introduction	  to	  the	  United	  States	  by	  Freud	  in	  1909.	  By	  this	  claim,	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  psychoanalysis	  did	  not	  produce	  new	  theories	  and	  other	  innovations.	  In	  fact,	  new	  theories	  proliferated	  during	  this	  time.	  That	  was	  part	  of	  the	  problem,	  though:	  the	  new	  theories	  produced	  by	  psychoanalysis	  often	  resembled	  divergent	  and	  contradicting	  schools	  of	  thought,	  and	  these	  new	  theories	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  dividing	  rather	  than	  unifying	  psychoanalysts.	  Furthermore,	  psychoanalysis	  seemed	  to	  lack	  the	  epistemic	  tools	  to	  test	  and	  reject	  some	  portion	  of	  these	  new	  theories,	  and	  so	  the	  creation	  of	  these	  new,	  competing	  schools	  of	  thought	  went	  unchecked.	  The	  proliferation	  of	  new	  ideas	  in	  psychoanalysis	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  psychoanalysis’	  development	  or	  to	  the	  unification	  of	  psychoanalysts,	  but	  rather	  to	  what	  historian	  of	  science	  Paul	  Stepansky	  terms	  the	  “fractionation”	  of	  psychoanalysis	  during	  this	  period.10	  I	  will	  substantiate	  this	  claim	  with	  a	  brief	  analysis	  of	  publishing	  trends	  of	  psychoanalytic	  books	  and	  journals.	  I	  am	  not	  writing	  a	  science	  or	  philosophy	  of	  science	  thesis,	  so	  I	  will	  not	  argue,	  and	  do	  not	  purport	  to	  know,	  whether	  the	  new	  theories	  produced	  by	  psychoanalysts	  during	  this	  time	  are	  true	  or	  false,	  or	  scientific	  or	  unscientific;	  rather,	  I	  am	  performing	  a	  historical	  analysis	  of	  what	  sociocultural	  factors	  stood	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  development	  of	  psychoanalysis	  as	  a	  science	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  seeming	  inability	  on	  the	  part	  of	  psychoanalysis	  to	  reject	  new	  theories	  as	  they	  were	  created,	  a	  related	  factor	  responsible	  for	  the	  discipline’s	  failure	  to	  entrench	  itself,	  I	  will	  argue,	  is	  that	  even	  as	  new	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theories	  sprang	  up	  uncontrolled,	  psychoanalytic	  thought,	  unlike	  other	  sciences,	  demonstrated	  an	  unusual	  inability	  to	  move	  past	  the	  ideas	  of	  its	  founder,	  Freud;	  furthermore,	  psychoanalysts	  who	  did	  so	  ran	  the	  risk	  of	  incurring	  stigma	  from	  other	  psychoanalysts.	  Whether	  psychoanalysts	  during	  this	  time	  would	  have	  thought	  of	  their	  reliance	  on	  Freud	  as	  a	  bad	  thing	  is,	  of	  course,	  debatable.	  My	  argument,	  though,	  is	  that,	  whether	  psychoanalysts	  considered	  it	  a	  drawback	  or	  not,	  their	  reliance	  on	  Freud	  hindered	  psychoanalysis’	  ability	  to	  develop	  and	  adapt	  as	  a	  science,	  according	  to	  the	  criteria	  for	  scientific	  knowledge	  that	  were	  coming	  to	  be	  increasingly	  formalized	  and	  applied	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  In	  my	  second	  chapter,	  I	  will	  investigate	  changes	  in	  the	  philosophy	  and	  practice	  of	  science	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century	  (e.g.	  the	  importance	  increasingly	  placed	  on	  reproducibility	  and	  falsifiability,	  and	  the	  growing	  role	  of	  double-­‐blind	  trials)	  to	  show	  how	  psychoanalysis	  as	  a	  means	  of	  producing	  knowledge	  began	  to	  fall	  out	  of	  favor.	  These	  historical	  changes	  were	  not	  good	  for	  the	  reputation	  of	  psychiatry,	  which	  was	  dominated	  by	  psychoanalytic	  thought,	  in	  the	  judgment	  of	  other	  branches	  of	  science	  and	  the	  public.	  Changing	  opinions	  on	  what	  was	  considered	  “legitimate”	  science	  or	  what	  constituted	  valid	  scientific	  knowledge	  during	  this	  time	  led	  to	  psychoanalysis’	  decline	  in	  psychiatry.	  Specific	  topics	  addressed	  in	  this	  chapter	  include	  the	  use	  and	  reputation	  of	  case	  studies,	  which	  for	  a	  long	  time	  constituted	  the	  backbone	  of	  psychoanalytic	  research,	  but	  declined	  in	  medicine	  and	  science	  as	  a	  whole	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  They	  were	  replaced	  by	  methods	  such	  as	  the	  double	  blind	  trial,	  which	  purported	  to	  eliminate	  subjectivity	  in	  research.	  I	  will	  show	  how	  the	  privileging	  of	  knowledge	  considered	  “objective,”	  gathered	  by	  certain	  technical	  methods	  but	  not	  others,	  eventually	  led	  to	  psychoanalysis’	  declining	  reputation	  and	  use.	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In	  the	  third	  chapter,	  I	  will	  compare	  psychoanalytic	  psychiatry	  with	  its	  successor,	  diagnostic	  psychiatry,	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  sociohistorical	  factors	  that	  led	  psychiatrists	  to	  abandon	  psychoanalysis	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s.	  By	  showing	  what	  made	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  successful,	  I	  hope	  to	  demonstrate	  why	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  was	  not:	  the	  shift	  to	  the	  diagnosis	  in	  understanding	  mental	  illness,	  which	  reached	  its	  apex	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  third	  edition	  of	  Diagnostic	  and	  Statistical	  Manual	  of	  Mental	  Disorders	  (DSM-­‐III),	  constitutes	  a	  major	  event	  in	  the	  history	  of	  American	  psychiatry,	  and	  by	  analyzing	  its	  rise	  and	  its	  eventual	  supplanting	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  it	  will	  be	  easier	  to	  understand	  why	  psychoanalysis	  fell	  out	  of	  favor.	  In	  particular,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  medical	  diagnoses	  of	  the	  DSM,	  in	  addition	  to	  increasing	  the	  reputation	  of	  psychiatry	  by	  emphasizing	  its	  “medicalness,”	  filled	  a	  void	  in	  American	  psychiatry	  by	  creating	  a	  system	  by	  which	  to	  study	  mental	  distress:	  a	  nosology	  of	  mental	  illnesses	  composed	  of	  a	  tremendous	  number	  of	  discrete	  conditions	  which	  made	  it	  easy	  to	  organize	  and	  accumulate	  knowledge	  about	  mental	  distress.	  Conversely,	  the	  neuroses	  of	  psychoanalysis	  were	  not	  discrete,	  but	  rather	  continuous	  with	  the	  “healthy”	  mind,	  and	  psychoanalysts	  placed	  little	  emphasis	  on	  diagnoses,	  if	  they	  were	  used	  at	  all:	  instead	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  a	  finite	  set	  of	  identified	  conditions,	  psychoanalysis	  viewed	  mental	  health	  as	  a	  spectrum.	  The	  continuous	  nature	  of	  psychoanalytic	  neuroses	  with	  normal	  mental	  life,	  I	  will	  argue,	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  organize	  and	  produce	  a	  body	  of	  medical	  knowledge	  about	  them,	  because	  they	  made	  categorization	  difficult	  and	  because	  medicine	  is	  based	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  normal	  and	  the	  pathological.	  The	  transition	  to	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  made	  the	  study	  and	  treatment	  of	  mental	  distress	  financially	  as	  well	  as	  epistemologically	  possible.	  The	  growing	  tendency	  of	  health	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insurance	  companies	  to	  cover	  part	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  psychotherapy	  necessitated	  the	  creation	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  categories	  for	  billing	  purposes,	  and	  the	  medical	  diagnoses	  of	  the	  DSM	  filled	  this	  role.	  Furthermore,	  these	  companies	  required	  some	  measurement	  and	  prediction	  of	  progress	  and	  outcomes	  in	  mentally	  ill	  patients,	  and	  the	  neat	  diagnoses	  of	  the	  DSM	  enabled	  bodies	  of	  research	  to	  be	  created	  for	  individual	  conditions.	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  National	  Institute	  of	  Mental	  Health	  (NIMH)	  to	  fund	  and	  direct	  research	  on	  mental	  illnesses	  during	  this	  time	  also	  created	  an	  incentive	  for	  a	  movement	  towards	  a	  formal	  and	  organized	  nosology	  of	  mental	  illness.	  Furthermore,	  though	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  replaced	  the	  dynamic	  model,	  in	  which	  neurosis	  was	  continuous	  with	  normal	  mental	  life,	  the	  sheer	  amount	  of	  diagnoses	  that	  it	  proposed	  ensured	  that	  psychiatrists	  would	  have	  no	  shortage	  of	  patients	  to	  treat.	  In	  concluding	  my	  Introduction,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  lay	  out	  particular	  definitions	  that	  I	  will	  use	  in	  my	  thesis.	  Psychiatry	  is	  the	  study	  and	  treatment	  of	  mental	  illnesses	  or	  mental	  suffering	  by	  individuals	  with	  medical	  training,	  specifically	  those	  with	  MD	  degrees	  or	  the	  international	  equivalent.	  Psychoanalysis	  is	  the	  name	  for	  the	  general	  psychological	  theory	  (or	  theories)	  devised	  by	  Freud,	  emphasizing	  unconscious	  drives	  and	  early	  childhood	  experiences.	  Psychodynamic	  or	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  was	  psychiatry	  that	  used	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  mentally	  ill.	  It	  contrasts	  with	  diagnostic	  psychiatry,	  which	  used	  a	  “medical	  model”	  consisting	  of	  discrete	  diagnoses	  in	  interpreting	  and	  treating	  mental	  illness.	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CHAPTER	  1	  
The	  Limits	  of	  Psychoanalytic	  Knowledge	  To	  say	  that	  psychoanalysis	  has	  grown	  stagnant	  as	  a	  scientific	  field	  may	  at	  first	  seem	  a	  sweeping	  and	  completely	  unwarranted	  claim.	  After	  all,	  in	  terms	  of	  producing	  new	  branches	  of	  thought,	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  has	  undoubtedly	  proven	  an	  expansive	  and	  fruitful	  domain;	  to	  argue	  that	  psychoanalytic	  progress	  suddenly	  stopped	  after	  Freud	  would	  require	  answering	  to	  object	  relations	  theory,	  ego	  psychology,	  self	  psychology,	  and	  Lacanian	  psychoanalysis,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few.	  Furthermore,	  rather	  than	  dying	  with	  Freud	  in	  1939,	  psychoanalysis	  produced	  these	  subfields	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  thinkers—the	  role	  of	  Melanie	  Klein,	  Anna	  Freud,	  Heinz	  Kohut,	  and	  Jacques	  Lacan	  in	  their	  respective	  theories	  above	  seem	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  psychoanalysis	  was	  not	  a	  one-­‐man	  show	  after	  all.	  In	  fact,	  it	  was	  during	  the	  decades	  immediately	  following	  Freud’s	  death	  that	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  was	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  its	  influence	  in	  the	  United	  States.11,12	  Given	  the	  proliferation	  of	  new	  models	  and	  theories	  of	  psychoanalytic	  thought	  under	  an	  equally	  diverse	  group	  of	  psychoanalysts,	  on	  what	  grounds	  could	  the	  argument	  that	  psychoanalysis	  failed	  to	  produce	  visible	  and	  useful	  knowledge	  possibly	  possess	  any	  merit?	  	   The	  answer	  is	  in	  the	  question:	  it	  was	  precisely	  the	  sheer	  amount	  and	  diversity	  of	  psychoanalytic	  subfields	  that	  delegitimized	  psychoanalysis	  as	  a	  whole:	  the	  presence	  of	  such	  diversity	  of	  opinion	  within	  the	  same	  field	  undermined	  the	  authority	  of	  any	  one	  subfield.	  Rather	  than	  adding	  to	  a	  collective	  fund	  of	  psychoanalytic	  knowledge,	  each	  of	  these	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Horwitz,	  52.	  	  12	  Nathan	  G.	  Hale,	  “American	  Psychoanalysis	  Since	  World	  War	  II,”	  in	  American	  Psychiatry	  
after	  World	  War	  II,	  1944-­1994,	  ed.	  Roy	  W.	  Menninger	  and	  John	  C.	  Nemiah	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  American	  Psychiatric	  Press,	  2000),	  96.	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subfields	  took	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  and	  practice.	  Former	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association	  president	  Alan	  Stone	  said:	  Today,	  at	  least	  in	  my	  opinion,	  and	  I	  am	  not	  entirely	  alone	  in	  thinking	  this,	  	   neither	  Anna	  Freud's	  Ego	  Psychology	  nor	  Melanie	  Klein's	  Object	  Relations	  	  	   Theory	  seem	  like	  systematic	  advances	  on	  Freud's	  ideas.	  Rather	  they	  seem	  	   like	  divergent	  schools	  of	  thought,	  no	  closer	  to	  Freud	  than	  Karen	  Horney	  who	  	   rebelled	  against	  Freudian	  orthodoxy.13	  	  The	  frequent	  emergence	  of	  these	  competing	  “divergent	  schools	  of	  thought”	  and	  their	  dissenting	  followers,	  then,	  made	  any	  developments	  in	  psychoanalysis	  seem	  to	  other	  scientists	  less	  like	  legitimate	  scientific	  discoveries	  and	  more	  like	  competing	  hypotheses.	  	  In	  contrast	  with	  more	  established	  fields	  like	  biology,	  innovations	  in	  psychoanalysis	  often	  seemed	  to	  contradict	  earlier	  psychoanalytic	  ideas	  as	  well	  as	  one	  another,	  frequently	  forming	  branches	  and	  sub-­‐branches	  without	  regard	  to	  maintaining	  any	  sort	  of	  continuity	  or	  internal	  consistency	  in	  psychoanalysis	  as	  a	  whole.14,15	  In	  fact,	  many	  of	  these	  developments	  were	  reactionary	  in	  nature,	  responding	  to	  other	  trends	  in	  psychoanalysis	  rather	  than	  to	  new	  clinical	  data.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Heinz	  Kohut’s	  development	  of	  self	  psychology,	  which	  was	  a	  reaction	  against	  the	  subfields	  of	  ego	  psychology	  and	  classical	  drive	  theory.	  The	  revival	  of	  American	  interest	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Melanie	  Klein	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  has	  also	  been	  described	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Alan	  A.	  Stone,	  “Where	  Will	  Psychoanalysis	  Survive?"	  (Keynote	  address	  to	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Psychoanalysis,	  December	  9,	  1995).	  http://harvardmagazine.com/1997/01/original.html.	  Accessed	  21	  March	  2014.	  14	  Stepansky,	  103.	  	  15	  Thomas	  Shapiro,	  “Editorial:	  Our	  Changing	  Science,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  
Psychoanalytic	  Association	  37	  (1989):	  4.	  
10	  
reaction	  against	  ego	  psychology.16	  Furthermore,	  never	  did	  one	  of	  these	  new	  theories	  thoroughly	  abrogate	  and	  replace	  a	  previous	  one	  in	  the	  way	  that,	  for	  example,	  Einstein’s	  theory	  of	  general	  relativity	  transformed	  Newtonian	  physics.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  a	  new	  idea	  in	  psychoanalysis	  would	  not	  have	  been	  met	  with	  resistance	  upon	  its	  introduction;	  however,	  it	  soon	  proved	  that	  psychoanalysis	  on	  the	  whole	  lacked	  the	  tools	  that	  other	  disciplines	  had	  to	  debunk	  or	  prove	  new	  theories.	  By	  what	  criteria	  could	  psychoanalysts	  reject	  or	  accept	  a	  new	  hypothesis?	  In	  physics,	  a	  new	  model	  was	  expected	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  currently	  available	  data,	  as	  well	  as	  able	  to	  make	  predictions	  to	  be	  confirmed	  by	  observation17;	  similarly,	  a	  new	  pharmaceutical	  drug	  was	  expected	  to	  prove	  itself	  by	  beating	  a	  control	  in	  a	  double-­‐blind	  trial.	  But	  such	  criteria,	  even	  if	  psychoanalysts	  wanted	  to	  use	  them,	  were	  not	  as	  conveniently	  applied	  to	  unconscious	  phenomena	  proposed	  by	  psychoanalysis.	  	  Even	  the	  gathering	  of	  data	  from	  clinical	  psychotherapy	  was	  typically	  unable	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflict	  between	  two	  competing	  subfields;	  problematically,	  any	  clinical	  data	  that	  could	  potentially	  prove	  the	  efficacy	  of	  one	  psychoanalytic	  school	  could	  be	  interpreted	  to	  support	  others	  as	  well.18	  In	  an	  article	  for	  Psychoanalytic	  Psychology,	  psychologist	  Robert	  Holt,	  even	  as	  he	  argued	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  psychoanalysis	  as	  a	  “testable	  scientific	  theory,”19	  admitted	  the	  difficulty	  of	  producing	  data	  that	  could	  settle	  disputes	  between	  psychoanalytic	  and	  non-­‐psychoanalytic	  theories,	  let	  alone	  between	  schools	  within	  psychoanalysis:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Hale,	  “American	  Psychoanalysis,”	  94-­‐95.	  	  17	  Newton’s	  laws	  of	  motion	  and	  gravitation,	  for	  example,	  enabled	  astronomers	  to	  predict	  that	  unexpected	  measurements	  of	  Uranus’	  orbit	  were	  not	  due	  to	  observational	  error,	  but	  to	  a	  large	  body	  affecting	  its	  orbit	  gravitationally;	  this	  was	  later	  confirmed	  to	  be	  the	  planet	  Neptune.	  18	  Hale,	  Rise	  and	  Crisis,	  362.	  19	  Robert	  R.	  Holt,	  “The	  Current	  Status	  of	  Psychoanalytic	  Theory,”	  Psychoanalytic	  Psychology	  2	  (1985),	  289. 
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All	  too	  often,	  the	  full	  set	  of	  data	  used	  to	  confirm	  a	  particular	  clinical	  hypothesis	  (and	  which	  therefore	  partly	  confirm	  the	  special	  clinical	  hypotheses	  entailed	  in	  it)	  are	  equally	  compatible	  with	  another	  set	  of	  general	  hypotheses.	  For	  example,	  we	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  followers	  of	  non-­‐Freudian	  schools	  of	  analysis	  or	  of	  nonpsychoanalytic	  clinical	  theories	  are	  ready	  with	  their	  own	  explanations	  of	  our	  cases.	  It	  is	  commonplace	  that	  most	  of	  these	  theories,	  with	  incompatible	  general	  hypotheses,	  are	  about	  equally	  capable	  of	  accommodating	  one	  another's	  data.	  All	  of	  them	  seem	  to	  be	  confirmed	  in	  clinical	  practice,	  but	  they	  cannot	  all	  be	  true.20 Observation	  and	  case	  studies,	  mainstays	  in	  the	  production	  of	  psychoanalytic	  knowledge,	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capability	  of	  rejecting	  new	  branches	  of	  psychoanalysis:	  observation	  might	  vary	  from	  analyst	  to	  analyst,21	  and	  the	  narrative	  nature	  of	  case	  studies	  made	  them	  more	  likely	  to	  respond	  to	  changing	  fashions	  in	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  than	  to	  refute	  or	  support	  them.22	  Because	  psychoanalysis	  lacked	  the	  scientific	  means	  or	  even	  the	  scientific	  criteria	  to	  identify	  a	  new	  theory	  as	  false	  and	  repudiate	  it,	  these	  branches	  went	  unpruned,	  until	  psychoanalysis	  was	  filled	  with	  them.	  Thus,	  the	  abundance	  of	  new	  schools	  of	  thought	  in	  psychoanalysis	  after	  Freud	  was,	  in	  fact,	  an	  overabundance:	  this	  vast	  proliferation	  of	  new	  ideas	  and	  models	  can	  be	  said	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  fruitfulness	  of	  Freud’s	  original	  theory	  only	  in	  that	  it	  publicly	  showcased	  an	  apparent	  epistemic	  inability	  on	  the	  part	  of	  psychoanalysis	  to	  reject	  any	  new	  hypotheses—except,	  perhaps,	  by	  means	  of	  partisan	  polemic.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Ibid.,	  302.	  21	  For	  a	  comprehensive	  argument	  against	  the	  validity	  of	  data	  gathered	  from	  clinical	  encounters,	  see	  Grünbaum’s	  The	  Foundations	  of	  Psychoanalysis.	  22	  Hale,	  Rise	  and	  Crisis,	  39.	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It	  might	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  continuing	  creation	  of	  psychoanalytic	  literature	  could	  function	  as	  proof	  of	  psychoanalysis’	  development	  as	  a	  field,	  that	  the	  shelves	  and	  shelves	  of	  clinical	  journals	  were	  more	  than	  sufficient	  evidence	  of	  psychoanalysis’	  growth	  and	  expansion.	  Certainly,	  psychoanalysis’	  ability	  to	  inspire	  new	  and	  endlessly	  original	  books	  and	  journal	  articles	  could	  not	  be	  denied;	  however,	  far	  from	  demonstrating	  psychoanalysis’	  capability	  of	  producing	  new	  information	  that	  pushes	  forward	  the	  field	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  actual	  publication	  of	  these	  books	  and	  journals	  provides	  an	  interesting	  case	  study	  in	  evidence	  of	  the	  contrary.23	  Historian	  of	  medicine	  Paul	  Stepansky	  claims	  that	  “journals	  such	  as	  [Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Psychoanalytic	  Foundation]	  and	  Psychoanalytic	  Quarterly	  now	  accept	  the	  reality	  of	  theoretical	  pluralism”	  and	  publish	  accordingly,	  accepting	  papers	  from	  a	  range	  of	  different	  subfields	  of	  psychoanalysis.24	  As	  even	  Theodore	  Shapiro,	  a	  psychoanalyst	  and	  former	  editor	  of	  the	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Psychoanalytic	  Foundation,	  conceded	  in	  a	  1989	  editorial	  in	  that	  very	  journal,	  “Even	  within	  analysis	  ‘not-­‐so-­‐complementary	  explanations’	  abound.	  We	  may	  now	  be	  said	  to	  variously	  espouse	  ego	  psychology,	  self	  psychology,	  separation-­‐individuation,	  and	  object-­‐relations	  psychology.	  Many	  say	  that	  these	  are	  simply	  viewpoints,	  but	  too	  often	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  alternative	  explanations.”25	  Given	  the	  role	  of	  journals	  in	  the	  dissemination	  of	  a	  field’s	  knowledge,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  ignore	  such	  a	  declaration	  of	  pluralism	  in	  psychoanalysis	  when	  it	  comes	  from	  an	  editor	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  journal	  in	  the	  field.	  	  Even	  as	  psychoanalytic	  literature	  expanded	  (and	  expands	  today)	  to	  accommodate	  the	  huge	  range	  of	  these	  “alternative	  explanations,”	  in	  terms	  of	  print	  runs	  the	  publications	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Stepansky,	  107.	  24	  Ibid.,	  106.	  	  25	  Shapiro,	  4.	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themselves	  were	  and	  are	  dying	  out.	  Stepansky,	  also	  the	  former	  Managing	  Director	  of	  the	  publishing	  company	  The	  Analytic	  Press,	  Inc.,	  writes:	  When	  I	  arrived	  at	  The	  Analytic	  Press	  in	  1983,	  my	  default	  print	  run	  for	  authored	  and	  edited	  books	  alike	  was	  1,500	  copies.	  That	  is,	  I	  could	  reasonably	  expect	  to	  sell	  at	  least	  1,500	  copies	  of	  everything	  we	  published.	  Between	  1983	  and	  2006,	  this	  default	  print	  run	  fell	  successively	  to	  1,200	  copies,	  then	  1,000	  copies,	  and	  ended	  up	  at	  700	  to	  800	  copies	  for	  many	  authored	  books.26	  Stepansky	  attributes	  this	  to	  the	  “fractionation”	  of	  psychoanalysis	  into	  an	  assortment	  of	  competing,	  rather	  than	  supporting,	  schools	  of	  thoughts,	  and	  the	  consequent	  inability	  of	  publishing	  firms	  to	  move	  enough	  copies	  of	  books	  to	  continue	  publishing	  them.	  Stepansky	  argues	  that	  “the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  big	  psychoanalytic	  book	  no	  longer	  exists,	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  the	  field	  is	  neither	  big	  enough	  nor	  cohesive	  enough	  nor	  influential	  enough	  to	  yield	  indigenously	  big	  books”;	  thus,	  psychoanalysis	  in	  its	  “dispiritedly	  pseudoentirety”	  lacks	  both	  the	  influence	  and	  self-­‐coherence	  necessary	  to	  attract	  nonanalytic	  therapists	  to	  its	  books.27	  Stepansky	  concludes:	  Psychoanalytic	  publishing	  is	  not	  failing	  because	  it	  cannot	  produce	  big	  books	  that	  pull	  together	  the	  various	  theoretical	  islands	  into	  which	  the	  field	  has	  drifted.	  It	  is	  failing	  because,	  owning	  to	  this	  selfsame	  fractionation	  and	  the	  simultaneous	  contraction	  of	  the	  field,	  its	  good-­‐enough	  books	  are	  no	  longer	  good	  enough	  to	  keep	  small	  professional	  firms	  in	  business.28	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Stepansky,	  74.	  27	  Ibid.,	  67.	  	  28	  Ibid.,	  75.	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Thus,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  texts	  is	  evidence	  of	  psychoanalysis’	  ability	  to	  grow	  as	  a	  discipline	  when	  psychoanalytic	  literature	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  fractionation	  and	  disappearance.29	  	   Even	  as	  psychoanalysis	  splintered	  to	  the	  point	  where	  theoretical	  pluralism	  became	  the	  norm	  for	  psychoanalytic	  books	  and	  journals,	  its	  progress	  was	  hindered,	  paradoxically,	  by	  a	  certain	  lack	  of	  originality:	  even	  as	  new	  theories	  sprang	  up	  prolifically,	  these	  ideas	  exhibited	  a	  difficulty	  in	  moving	  past	  Freud.	  An	  analysis	  of	  these	  ideas	  reveals	  that	  this	  difficulty	  was	  not	  due	  to	  a	  mere	  lack	  of	  creativity	  or	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  psychoanalysts;	  rather,	  it	  was	  because	  Freud	  had	  taken	  on	  a	  function	  that	  exceeded	  his	  role	  as	  the	  founder	  of	  psychoanalysis.	  	  	   In	  many	  cases,	  this	  meant	  that	  fidelity	  to	  Freud	  became	  a	  criterion	  for	  acceptance	  within	  the	  psychoanalytic	  community.	  This	  can	  be	  shown	  by	  the	  case	  of	  Otto	  Rank.	  Rank	  was	  an	  early	  disciple	  of	  Freud’s;	  Freud	  affectionately	  referred	  to	  him	  as	  a	  “bright	  and	  honest	  boy.”30	  Rank	  even	  sat	  on	  Freud’s	  secret	  committee,	  an	  “inner	  circle”	  of	  the	  six	  psychoanalysts	  closest	  to	  Freud,	  which	  lasted	  in	  its	  initial	  form	  from	  1912	  to	  1924.	  This	  committee,	  which	  formed	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Alfred	  Adler’s	  and	  Wilhelm	  Stekel’s	  departures	  from	  Freud’s	  theories	  as	  well	  as	  Carl	  Jung’s	  anticipated	  defection,	  was	  specifically	  dedicated	  to	  helping	  Freud	  respond	  to	  critics.	  The	  central	  agreements	  of	  this	  committee	  ensured	  loyalty	  in	  Freud’s	  closest	  followers;	  as	  Sulloway	  notes,	  “No	  member	  of	  the	  committee	  was	  to	  depart	  publicly	  from	  any	  of	  the	  fundamental	  tenets	  of	  psychoanalysis	  without	  first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Ibid.,	  106.	  30	  Letter	  from	  Sigmund	  Freud	  to	  Ernest	  Jones,	  February	  24,	  1912.	  The	  Complete	  
Correspondence	  of	  Sigmund	  Freud	  and	  Ernest	  Jones,	  1908-­1939,	  ed.	  Andrew	  R.	  Paskauskas	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  133.	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discussing	  his	  views	  with	  the	  others.”31	  Freud	  even	  distributed	  ceremonial	  rings	  to	  this	  secret	  committee.32	  	   Thus,	  it	  came	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  Freud	  and	  the	  committee	  when	  Rank	  published	  The	  
Trauma	  of	  Birth	  in	  1924.	  In	  this	  book,	  Rank	  deviated	  from	  Freud’s	  idea	  of	  the	  Oedipus	  complex	  as	  the	  source	  of	  all	  neuroses	  as	  well	  as	  art,	  religion,	  and	  philosophy,	  instead	  proposing	  the	  traumatic	  pain	  of	  being	  born	  as	  the	  “prototype	  of	  all	  later	  attacks	  of	  fear.”33	  This	  was	  not	  a	  small	  deviation:	  Freud	  had	  made	  the	  Oedipus	  complex	  the	  basis	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  and	  Rank	  was	  asserting	  that	  Oedipal	  conflicts	  with	  the	  father	  were	  just	  “a	  mask	  for	  the	  essential	  ones	  concerning	  birth”	  and	  the	  mother.34	  Rank,	  even	  by	  coining	  the	  term	  “pre-­‐Oedipal,”35	  had	  committed	  heresy.	  Freud’s	  reaction	  to	  birth	  trauma	  was	  initially	  mixed	  but	  soon	  turned	  hostile.	  Ernest	  Jones,	  biographer	  of	  Freud	  and	  member	  of	  the	  secret	  committee	  himself,	  quotes	  Freud	  as	  saying,	  “I	  believe	  it	  will	  ‘fall	  flat’	  if	  one	  does	  not	  criticize	  it	  too	  sharply,	  and	  then	  Rank,	  whom	  I	  value	  for	  his	  gifts	  and	  the	  great	  service	  he	  has	  rendered,	  will	  have	  learned	  a	  useful	  lesson.”36	  	  	   In	  the	  meantime,	  Rank	  visited	  America,	  and	  shared	  the	  news	  that	  “the	  ‘old’	  psychoanalysis	  had	  been	  quite	  superseded	  by	  his	  new	  discoveries.”37	  This	  claim	  met	  with	  a	  cool	  reception.	  Abraham	  Brill,	  for	  example,	  an	  influential	  psychoanalyst	  whose	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Frank	  J.	  Sulloway,	  “Reassessing	  Freud's	  Case	  Histories:	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Psychoanalysis,”	  Isis	  82	  (1991),	  245-­‐275,	  269.	  	  32	  Sherry	  Turkle,	  Psychoanalytic	  Politics:	  Freud’s	  French	  Revolution	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books	  Inc.,	  1978),	  120.	  33	  Ernest	  Jones,	  The	  Life	  and	  Work	  of	  Sigmund	  Freud,	  ed.	  and	  abridged	  by	  Lionel	  Trilling	  and	  Steven	  Marcus	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  Inc.,	  1961),	  418.	  	  34	  Ibid.	  	  35	  Otto	  Rank,	  The	  Psychology	  of	  Difference:	  The	  American	  Lectures,	  ed.	  by	  Robert	  Kramer	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  43.	  36	  Ibid.,	  425.	  37	  Ibid.,	  425-­‐426.	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achievements	  included	  founding	  the	  New	  York	  Psychoanalytic	  Society,	  translating	  Freud	  into	  English	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  and	  being	  the	  first	  practicing	  psychoanalyst	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  had	  one	  reaction:	  he	  simply	  “wanted	  to	  know	  what	  Freud	  had	  to	  say	  about	  it	  all.”38	  	  	   Rank’s	  reception	  in	  America	  was	  dimmed	  by	  further	  ostracization	  from	  Freud’s	  committee	  back	  in	  Europe.	  After	  a	  short	  period	  of	  rather	  cold	  correspondence,	  the	  ideological	  tension	  between	  Freud	  and	  Rank	  soon	  turned	  personal:	  Freud	  said,	  “When	  he	  comes	  to	  his	  senses	  it	  will	  of	  course	  be	  the	  time…	  to	  forgive	  him	  all	  his	  divagations.	  I	  dare	  not	  hope	  for	  that,	  however;	  experience	  shows	  that	  once	  the	  devil	  is	  loose	  he	  goes	  his	  way	  to	  the	  very	  end.”39	  This	  strong	  reaction	  caused	  Sándor	  Ferenczi,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  committee	  who	  was	  very	  close	  to	  Rank,	  who	  had	  coauthored	  a	  book	  with	  Rank	  the	  same	  year	  that	  Rank	  released	  The	  Trauma	  of	  Birth,	  and	  who	  had	  originally	  extolled	  the	  improved	  clinical	  outcomes	  of	  psychoanalysis	  based	  on	  Rank’s	  birth	  trauma	  theory,	  to	  think	  that	  he	  had	  placed	  himself	  on	  the	  “losing”	  team.	  Jones	  writes,	  “[Ferenczi]	  had	  been	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  a	  precipice,	  and	  he	  now	  drew	  himself	  back	  in	  an	  unmistakable	  fashion.	  He	  announced	  to	  Freud	  after	  reading	  Rank’s	  rude	  letter	  that	  he	  had	  definitely	  turned	  his	  back	  on	  him.”40	  	   Rank	  returned	  to	  Vienna	  to	  say	  goodbye	  to	  Freud	  and	  share	  with	  the	  committee	  his	  intention	  to	  move	  to	  and	  work	  in	  America	  semi-­‐permanently.	  Rank,	  who	  had	  been	  diagnosed	  with	  what	  is	  now	  called	  bipolar	  disorder,	  almost	  immediately	  fell	  into	  a	  depressive	  state,	  not	  making	  it	  past	  Paris	  on	  his	  journey	  back	  to	  America.	  Rank	  delivered	  a	  wholehearted	  apology	  to	  both	  the	  committee	  and	  Freud,	  who	  received	  his	  apology	  gladly.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Ibid.,	  426.	  39	  Ibid.,	  427.	  40	  Ibid.,	  427.	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However,	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  did	  not	  last	  long,	  and	  in	  1926,	  Rank	  once	  again	  said	  goodbye	  to	  Freud	  and	  departed	  Vienna.	  	  	   Rank	  died	  a	  little	  more	  than	  ten	  years	  later,	  and	  his	  post-­‐Freud	  efforts	  did	  not	  prove	  particularly	  fruitful.41	  Freud	  rarely	  mentioned	  him,	  and	  when	  he	  did,	  it	  was	  not	  usually	  in	  positive	  ways.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  “All	  that	  mattered	  to	  Freud	  was	  that	  [his]	  work	  should	  be	  clearly	  differentiated	  from	  psychoanalysis.”42	  Thus,	  Rank’s	  theory	  of	  birth	  trauma,	  which	  was	  originally	  received	  with	  great	  enthusiasm	  by	  many	  members	  of	  the	  committee,	  proved	  to	  signal	  the	  end	  of	  his	  career	  when	  Freud’s	  opinion	  of	  it	  shifted	  from	  undecided	  to	  negative,	  thereby	  changing	  its	  status	  from	  psychoanalytic	  to	  non-­‐psychoanalytic.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  use	  an	  example	  like	  Rank,	  a	  contemporary	  and	  disciple	  of	  Freud,	  to	  show	  how	  Freud	  governed	  psychoanalytic	  discourse	  in	  his	  lifetime.	  But	  what	  of	  psychoanalysis	  
after	  Freud?	  In	  fact,	  post-­‐Freudian	  psychoanalysts	  operated	  no	  more	  independently	  from	  Freud’s	  influence	  than	  Rank	  did.	  This	  is	  perfectly	  illustrated	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Jacques	  Lacan.	  Though	  he	  produced	  much	  original	  work	  and	  gathered	  his	  own	  crowd	  of	  followers,	  Lacan	  began	  his	  career	  not	  with	  a	  move	  forward,	  but	  a	  move	  back,	  in	  that	  his	  most	  notable	  idea	  was	  that	  of	  a	  “return	  to	  Freud”:	  a	  rereading	  of	  Freud’s	  works	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  linguistics,	  mathematics,	  and	  contemporary	  philosophy.	  It	  is	  not	  mere	  coincidence	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  notable	  ideas	  from	  one	  of	  the	  most	  notable	  thinkers	  in	  the	  field	  of	  psychoanalysis	  should	  be	  defined	  primarily	  by	  his	  relationship	  with	  its	  founder;	  in	  fact,	  Lacan’s	  case	  is	  quite	  characteristic	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  progress	  in	  psychoanalytic	  thought	  in	  that	  it	  is	  constantly	  mediated	  by	  Freud’s	  original	  work.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Ibid.,	  430.	  	  42	  Ibid.	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   The	  relationship	  of	  Lacan’s	  work	  to	  Freud’s	  is	  complex.	  Though	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  Lacan	  remains	  the	  only	  psychoanalyst	  whose	  ideas	  bear	  serious	  comparison	  to	  Freud’s	  own,43	  his	  work	  was	  produced—and	  received—not	  independently,	  but	  as	  part	  of	  a	  perpetual	  conversation	  with	  his	  predecessor.	  Thus,	  to	  say	  that	  Lacan	  work	  was	  unable	  to	  operate	  independently	  from	  Freud	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Lacan	  was	  merely	  rehashing	  old	  Freudian	  ideas—Malcolm	  Bowie	  argues	  that	  even	  his	  “return	  to	  Freud”	  was	  “conducted	  on	  Freud’s	  behalf,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  against	  him.”44	  It	  is	  merely	  to	  say	  that,	  whether	  he	  is	  assenting	  to	  or	  dissenting	  with	  Freud,	  he	  is	  always	  operating	  within	  the	  sphere	  of	  his	  influence:	  Freud	  remains	  an	  essential	  reference.	  Sometimes,	  this	  involved	  Lacan	  deliberately	  working	  Freud’s	  authority	  to	  his	  advantage,	  attributing,	  for	  rhetorical	  purposes,	  his	  own	  ideas	  to	  Freud;45	  Dany	  Nobus	  argues	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  ideas	  in	  Lacan’s	  “return	  to	  Freud”	  to	  succeed,	  he	  needed	  to	  justify	  the	  necessity	  of	  his	  project	  by	  showing	  how	  the	  French	  psychoanalytic	  establishment	  had	  been	  misinterpreting	  Freud.46	  But	  the	  authority	  that	  came	  with	  Freud’s	  name	  proved	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword	  for	  Lacan:	  on	  the	  occasions	  when	  Lacan	  truly	  did	  break	  away	  from	  Freud,	  it	  often	  proved	  detrimental	  to	  both	  his	  career	  and	  the	  reception	  of	  his	  work.	  This	  is	  seen	  most	  notably	  in	  Lacan’s	  prime	  clinical	  contribution:	  the	  “variable-­‐length”	  therapy	  session.	  For	  Lacan,	  it	  seemed	  that	  the	  therapy	  session	  should	  not	  end	  after	  a	  “fifty	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  See	  Malcolm	  Bowie,	  Lacan.	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1991).	  	  44	  Ibid.,	  7	  45	  Élisabeth	  Roudinesco,	  Jacques	  Lacan,	  trans.	  Barbara	  Bray.	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  440.	  	  46	  Dany	  Nobus,	  “Knowledge	  in	  Failure:	  On	  the	  Crises	  of	  Legitimacy	  in	  Lacanian	  Psychoanalysis,”	  Who	  Owns	  Psychoanalysis?,	  ed.	  by	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  Casement.	  (London:	  Karnac	  Books,	  1994),	  210.	  
19	  
minute	  hour,”	  the	  norm	  for	  psychoanalysis	  at	  the	  time,47	  but	  in	  order	  to	  punctuate	  a	  conversation	  between	  analyst	  and	  analysand.	  End	  the	  session	  was	  itself	  intended	  to	  function	  as	  an	  analytic	  technique,	  enabling	  the	  analyst	  to	  highlight	  a	  significant	  breakthrough	  had	  been	  made	  (or	  simply	  to	  prevent	  an	  analysand	  from	  wasting	  time).	  Rather	  than	  bury	  such	  breakthroughs	  with	  further	  talk	  until	  the	  requisite	  fifty	  minutes	  had	  elapsed,	  he	  argued,	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  session	  should	  be	  determined	  by	  analytic	  progress.	  For	  Lacan,	  this	  meant	  that	  sessions	  sometimes	  ran	  just	  a	  few	  minutes.	  Predictably,	  this	  innovation	  was	  highly	  upsetting	  to	  the	  psychoanalytic	  establishment.	  Lacan’s	  critics	  alleged	  a	  financial	  motive:	  the	  ability	  of	  an	  analyst	  to	  end	  sessions	  when	  they	  wanted	  meant	  that	  they	  could	  see	  more	  patients	  in	  an	  hour,	  and	  “variable-­‐length	  sessions”	  typically	  meant	  “short	  sessions,”	  as	  Lacan’s	  opponents	  rechristened	  them.48,49	  As	  Sherry	  Turkle	  notes,	  “[O]f	  course,	  patients	  want	  to	  know	  why	  the	  Lacanian	  analyst	  never	  wants	  to	  ‘shake	  up’	  the	  routine	  by	  keeping	  them	  for	  more	  rather	  than	  less	  time.”50	  More	  important,	  though,	  Lacan	  had	  committed	  a	  fatal	  error:	  he	  had	  broken	  from	  Freud.	  Though	  Freud	  did	  not	  always	  meet	  for	  hour-­‐long	  sessions,	  when	  he	  diverged	  from	  this	  pattern,	  it	  was	  usually	  for	  longer	  sessions,	  not	  shorter.51	  In	  any	  case,	  Lacan	  had	  taken	  the	  authority	  to	  make	  a	  radical	  change	  in	  his	  clinical	  technique	  without	  grounding	  it	  in	  Freud.	  Nobus	  writes,	  “With	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  variable-­‐length	  sessions,	  Lacan,	  of	  course,	  favored	  a	  technical	  principle	  that	  had	  not	  featured	  as	  such	  within	  Freud’s	  original	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Ibid.,	  212.	  48	  Bruce	  Fink,	  A	  Clinical	  Introduction	  to	  Lacanian	  Psychoanalysis:	  Theory	  and	  Technique.	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  17.	  	  49	  Ibid.	  50	  Turkle,	  204.	  51	  Richard	  Friedman,	  “Shrinking	  Hours,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  October	  12,	  2013.	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/opinion/sunday/shrinking-­‐hours.html?_r=0.	  Accessed	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  2014.	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discourse,	  and	  this	  lack	  of	  Freudian	  justification	  no	  doubt	  contributed	  to	  his	  being	  perceived	  as	  deviating	  dangerously	  from	  a	  central	  aspect	  of	  psychoanalytic	  practice.”52	  	  Lacan	  tried	  to	  establish	  a	  Freudian	  basis	  for	  his	  innovation	  retroactively,53	  but	  the	  damage	  was	  done;	  for	  other	  psychoanalysts,	  this	  innovation	  was	  too	  much	  to	  bear.	  Lacan,	  under	  intense	  fire	  from	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Société	  Parisienne	  de	  Psychanalyse,	  the	  dominant	  psychoanalytic	  group	  in	  France	  at	  this	  time,	  left	  the	  group	  and	  founded	  his	  own	  with	  other	  estranged	  analysts	  in	  1953.54	  This	  new	  institution,	  though,	  due	  to	  its	  affiliation	  with	  Lacan,	  was	  unable	  to	  join	  the	  International	  Psychoanalytical	  Association	  (IPA),	  and	  ten	  years	  later,	  when	  the	  IPA	  offered	  the	  group	  the	  ability	  to	  join	  their	  ranks	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  Lacan	  be	  stripped	  of	  his	  status	  as	  a	  training	  analyst,	  they	  accepted.55	  	  	   Foucault’s	  seminal	  essay	  “What	  is	  an	  Author?”	  offers	  a	  critical	  standpoint	  in	  examining	  the	  inability	  of	  analysts	  like	  Rank	  and	  Lacan	  fully	  to	  move	  past	  Freud.	  According	  to	  Foucault,	  authors	  are	  not	  merely	  the	  creators	  of	  texts;	  they	  constitute	  a	  function	  by	  which	  such	  texts	  are	  organized.	  When	  these	  authors	  become	  what	  Foucault	  terms	  “founders	  of	  discursivity,”	  they	  “become	  more	  than	  just	  the	  authors	  of	  their	  own	  works.	  They	  have	  produced	  something	  else:	  the	  possibilities	  and	  the	  rules	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  other	  texts.”56	  However	  inspired	  Rank	  or	  Lacan’s	  ideas	  may	  have	  been,	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  as	  psychoanalytic	  they	  needed	  to	  situate	  themselves	  within	  a	  Freudian	  discourse,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  their	  texts	  were	  governed	  by	  the	  rules	  initiated	  by	  its	  founder.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Nobus,	  220.	  53	  Ibid.	  54	  Ibid.,	  213.	  55	  Ibid.,	  214-­‐215.	  56	  Michel	  Foucault,	  “What	  is	  an	  Author?”	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  Essential	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  ed.	  by	  Paul	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  and	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Thus,	  when	  such	  authors	  become	  the	  organizing	  principle	  for	  texts	  in	  a	  particular	  discourse,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  distance	  a	  work	  fully	  from	  the	  founder	  of	  that	  discourse	  if	  one	  is	  to	  remain	  within	  that	  discourse;	  Foucault	  writes	  of	  “the	  inevitable	  necessity,	  within	  these	  fields	  of	  discursivity,	  for	  a	  ‘return	  to	  the	  origin.’”57	  This	  was	  certainly	  the	  case	  in	  post-­‐Freudian	  psychoanalysis:	  in	  fact,	  Foucault’s	  mention	  of	  the	  “return	  to	  the	  origin”	  is	  a	  direct	  reference	  to	  Lacan,	  who	  was	  present	  at	  Foucault’s	  reading	  of	  the	  paper	  and	  participated	  with	  interest	  in	  the	  discussion	  that	  followed.58	  Foucault	  continues,	  “Reexamination	  of	  Galileo’s	  text	  may	  well	  change	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  history	  of	  mechanics,	  but	  it	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  change	  mechanics	  itself.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  reexamining	  Freud’s	  texts	  modifies	  psychoanalysis	  itself…”59	  That	  is,	  though	  a	  discourse	  may	  change	  over	  time,	  in	  some	  cases	  (Foucault	  mentions	  Freud	  and	  Marx)	  it	  is	  still	  fundamentally	  bound	  to	  the	  works	  of	  that	  discourse’s	  founder,	  which	  generate	  criteria	  for	  judging	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  subsequent	  work	  actually	  belongs	  to	  the	  discourse	  in	  question.	  Jean-­‐Michel	  Rabaté,	  in	  the	  
Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Lacan,	  summarizes	  thusly:	  “[I]f	  Marxism	  and	  psychoanalysis	  do	  not	  have	  the	  status	  of	  hard	  sciences,	  it	  is	  because	  they	  are	  still	  in	  debt	  to	  the	  texts	  of	  a	  founder…”60	  Unlike	  other	  disciplines	  (Foucault	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  physics),	  progress	  in	  psychoanalysis	  is	  mediated	  through	  and	  restricted	  by	  its	  founder.	  	  In	  his	  address	  to	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Psychoanalysis,	  Stone	  asked,	  “What	  is	  there	  about	  Freud's	  vision	  that	  has	  made	  his	  monumental	  work	  a	  limiting	  factor	  rather	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Ibid.	  389.	  58	  Jean-­‐Michel	  Rabaté,	  “Lacan’s	  Turn	  to	  Freud,”	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Lacan.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  7.	   59	  Foucault,	  389.	  	  	  60	  Rabaté,	  8.	  	  
22	  
than	  a	  scaffolding	  on	  which	  others	  can	  stand?”61	  Foucault	  states	  that,	  though	  the	  future	  of	  such	  discourses	  is	  likely	  (or	  even	  necessarily)	  characterized	  by	  divergences	  from	  their	  founders,	  they	  may	  never	  directly	  contradict	  them.	  One	  can	  avoid	  statements	  by	  a	  founder	  of	  discursivity	  if	  they	  can	  be	  “deemed	  inessential”	  or	  “derived	  from	  another	  type	  of	  discursivity,”	  but,	  crucially,	  “one	  does	  not	  declare	  certain	  propositions	  in	  the	  work	  of	  these	  founders	  to	  be	  false…”62	  In	  this,	  we	  find	  the	  answer	  to	  Stone’s	  question.	  Like	  the	  ideological	  fractionation	  that	  plagued	  psychoanalysis	  through	  the	  20th	  century,	  Freud’s	  authority	  and	  inescapable	  influence	  imposed	  constraints	  on	  psychoanalysis	  that	  stunted	  its	  ability	  to	  achieve	  meaningful	  intellectual	  expansion	  and	  develop	  itself	  as	  a	  scientific	  discipline.	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CHAPTER	  2	  
Psychoanalysis	  and	  the	  Criteria	  of	  Objectivity	  	   In	  his	  1995	  keynote	  address	  to	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Psychoanalysis,	  Alan	  Stone,	  a	  graduate	  of	  the	  Boston	  Psychoanalytic	  Institute	  and	  former	  president	  of	  the	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  made	  a	  surprising	  declaration:	  he	  and	  the	  other	  “faithful”	  had	  become	  disillusioned	  with	  psychoanalysis	  and	  its	  critics	  appeared	  correct.	  He	  claimed	  that	  psychoanalysis	  was	  not	  an	  “adequate	  form	  of	  treatment”	  and	  psychoanalysis’	  future	  lay	  in	  the	  arts	  and	  humanities.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  psychoanalysis	  should	  be	  used	  therapeutically	  only	  after	  a	  patient’s	  actual	  symptoms	  had	  been	  dealt	  with.	  At	  the	  root	  of	  psychoanalysis’	  failure	  as	  a	  medical	  science,	  Stone	  argued,	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  psychoanalysis	  did	  not	  function	  as	  a	  “cumulative	  discipline.”63	  	   Though	  the	  occasion	  for	  Stone’s	  declaration	  was	  surprising,	  its	  timing	  was	  not.	  Psychoanalysis	  had	  been	  consistently	  declining	  in	  popularity	  with	  the	  public	  and	  within	  science	  for	  several	  decades.	  By	  1990,	  a	  survey	  by	  the	  American	  Psychoanalytic	  Association	  found	  that	  its	  analysts	  were	  seeing,	  on	  average,	  only	  two	  patients	  for	  analysis	  a	  week.64	  Stone,	  in	  arguing	  for	  the	  persistence	  of	  psychoanalysis	  in	  the	  arts	  and	  humanities	  but	  not	  in	  psychiatry	  or	  clinical	  treatment,	  and	  in	  deeming	  Freud	  an	  “artist/subjectivist/philosopher”	  rather	  than	  a	  “physician/objectivist/scientist,”	  highlighted	  one	  of	  the	  most	  salient	  factors	  in	  psychoanalysis’	  perceived	  failure	  as	  a	  psychiatric	  tool:	  Freud,	  though	  a	  genius,	  was	  a	  thinker,	  an	  interpreter,	  not	  a	  scientist:	  he	  had	  created	  a	  field	  of	  study	  that	  was	  simply	  not	  objective	  enough	  to	  function	  as	  a	  science.	  Stone,	  giving	  the	  example	  of	  Freud’s	  explanation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Stone.	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  Engel,	  American	  Therapy:	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  States.	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  Group	  Inc.:	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of	  religious	  asceticism,	  said,	  “A	  marvelous	  subjective	  speculation—I	  find	  it	  persuasive,	  but	  is	  it	  empirical?	  Is	  it	  based	  on	  objective	  data?”	  	   These	  questions	  had	  haunted	  psychoanalysis	  long	  before	  Stone’s	  speech,	  but	  Stone’s	  phrasing	  highlights	  psychoanalysis’	  struggles	  perfectly.	  Stone	  claims	  that	  Freud’s	  methods	  are	  “not	  recognizable	  as	  science,”	  but	  in	  the	  same	  sentence	  admits	  that	  he	  knows	  of	  “no	  other	  work	  in	  psychiatry	  or	  psychology…	  so	  immediately	  convincing.”	  What	  psychoanalysis	  suffered	  from,	  in	  other	  words,	  was	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  culture’s	  prime	  concern	  from	  “Is	  it	  useful?”	  or	  even	  “Is	  it	  true?”	  to	  “Is	  it	  empirical?	  Is	  it	  based	  on	  objective	  data?”	  The	  historical	  rise	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  objectivity	  and	  scientific	  empiricism	  to	  a	  position	  of	  dominance	  in	  medicine	  was,	  for	  psychoanalysis,	  simply	  poor	  timing.	  	   One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  ways	  in	  which	  psychoanalysis	  was	  unable	  to	  adapt	  to	  changing	  standards	  of	  medicine	  was	  its	  inability	  to	  move	  past	  the	  case	  study	  as	  the	  primary	  means	  of	  gathering	  and	  disseminating	  psychoanalytic	  discoveries.	  The	  case	  study	  was	  of	  great	  use	  in	  the	  dynamic	  model	  because	  it	  allowed	  the	  sort	  of	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  a	  patient	  that	  was	  necessary	  to	  meet	  the	  conditions	  of	  psychoanalytic	  knowledge;	  when	  exploring	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  unconscious,	  texts	  that	  focused	  on	  thoroughly	  uncovering	  the	  psychological	  state	  of	  one	  patient	  would	  be	  more	  informative	  than	  studies	  of	  multiple	  patients	  at	  once.	  	  As	  with	  many	  trademarks	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  the	  prevalence	  of	  the	  case	  study	  in	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  Freud,	  who	  used	  six	  detailed	  case	  studies	  after	  developing	  psychoanalytic	  therapy.	  Freud	  used	  these	  case	  studies	  as	  ways	  of	  entering	  into	  a	  particular	  diagnosis	  or	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  particular	  technique—treatment	  via	  dream	  interpretation,	  for	  example,	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  case	  study	  of	  “Dora,”	  a	  teenager	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Freud	  diagnosed	  with	  hysteria,	  in	  Fragments	  of	  an	  Analysis	  of	  a	  Case	  of	  Hysteria.	  He	  even	  used	  his	  own	  experiences	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  case	  studies,	  such	  as	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  dream	  he	  titled	  “Irma’s	  Injection”	  in	  The	  Interpretation	  of	  Dreams.	  	  	   Despite	  the	  curious	  fact	  that	  these	  case	  studies	  involved	  mostly	  patients	  whose	  therapy	  was,	  by	  Freud’s	  own	  admission,	  unsuccessful,65	  the	  central	  role	  of	  the	  case	  study	  in	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  persisted	  well	  after	  Freud’s	  death	  in	  1939.	  In	  1952,	  for	  example,	  the	  influential	  dynamic	  psychiatrist	  Karl	  Menninger	  published	  his	  Manual	  for	  Psychiatric	  Case	  
Study,	  which	  was	  warmly	  received.66	  And	  in	  1965,	  a	  dedicated	  Freudian	  named	  Kurt	  Eissler	  declared	  case	  studies	  “the	  pillars	  on	  which	  psychoanalysis	  as	  an	  empirical	  science	  rests.”67	  In	  fact,	  the	  case	  study	  as	  a	  means	  of	  presenting	  research	  was	  originally	  a	  standard	  and	  accepted	  practice	  in	  all	  branches	  of	  medicine,	  not	  just	  psychiatry.68	  However,	  it	  began	  to	  fall	  out	  of	  favor	  in	  medicine	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  development	  of	  research	  techniques	  that	  were	  designed	  to	  produce	  truth	  free	  from	  subjective	  error	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  the	  case	  study	  could	  not.	  One	  such	  development	  was	  the	  double-­‐blind	  trial,	  in	  which	  neither	  the	  test	  subjects	  nor	  the	  experimenters	  are	  aware	  of	  which	  subjects	  are	  receiving	  treatment	  and	  which	  are	  receiving	  the	  placebo.	  The	  development	  of	  this	  revolutionary	  new	  technique	  coincided	  very	  closely	  with	  dynamic	  psychiatry’s	  decline.	  Ken	  Alder	  writes,	  “Shortly	  after	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Cold	  War…	  double-­‐blind	  reviews	  became	  the	  norm	  for	  conducting	  scientific	  medical	  research,	  as	  well	  as	  the	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  E.g.,	  William	  B.	  Terhune,	  “A	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  American	  Journal	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Psychiatry,	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  (1954),	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  Eissler,	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  and	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means	  by	  which	  peers	  evaluated	  scholarship.”69	  Other	  scholars	  confirm	  this	  dating.70	  (Marcia	  Meldrum	  links	  the	  growth	  in	  popularity	  of	  double-­‐blind	  trials	  at	  this	  time	  to	  the	  need	  of	  the	  booming	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  to	  establish	  the	  credibility	  with	  the	  public.71)	  The	  double-­‐blind	  trial’s	  conscious	  rejection	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  professional	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  case	  study,	  which	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  is	  inseparable	  from	  the	  experience,	  knowledge,	  and	  authority—which	  is	  to	  say,	  subjectivity—of	  the	  professional.	  In	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  case	  study,	  the	  subject	  speaks	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  with	  the	  professional,	  who	  is	  the	  same	  one	  to	  record	  information	  gathered	  from	  sessions,	  and	  is	  the	  same	  one	  to	  interpret	  it.	  	  The	  large	  role	  of	  the	  professional	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  case	  study	  opens	  it	  up	  to	  more	  than	  just	  the	  mere	  threat	  of	  bias;	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  professional	  is,	  in	  fact,	  an	  integral	  component	  of	  the	  case	  study.	  Stepansky	  makes	  this	  point	  by	  contrasting	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  mind	  in	  the	  case	  study	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  heart	  sounds:	  	  The	  sounds	  heard	  by	  the	  analyst	  are	  very	  different:	  They	  are	  verbal	  expressions	  of	  complex	  mental	  “productions,”	  which	  are	  themselves	  embedded	  in	  dense	  life	  narratives.	  How	  does	  the	  analyst	  hear	  these	  sounds?	  He	  listens	  through	  a	  theoretical	  filter	  that	  translates	  sounds	  into	  meaningful,	  narratively	  embedded	  utterances.	  This	  filter…	  comprises	  not	  only	  a	  theory	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(or	  theoretical	  sensibility)	  but	  also	  the	  analyst’s	  own	  subjective	  personhood,	  his	  or	  her	  own	  unique	  subjectivity.72	  Thus,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  case	  study	  is	  not	  merely	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  therapist;	  it	  is	  predicated	  on	  it.	  	  	   Far	  from	  meeting	  the	  criteria	  for	  objectivity	  that	  was	  growing	  ever	  more	  important	  to	  science	  in	  the	  1960s,	  the	  case	  history	  began	  to	  seem	  less	  like	  a	  research	  method	  and	  more	  like	  a	  literary	  form.	  Interestingly,	  though	  Freud	  never	  won	  the	  Nobel	  Prize	  in	  medicine,	  Thomas	  Mann	  and	  other	  literary	  notables	  of	  the	  day	  publicly	  advocated	  for	  him	  to	  be	  awarded	  the	  Nobel	  Prize	  in	  literature,73	  and	  he	  did	  win	  the	  Goethe	  Prize,	  a	  literary	  award,	  in	  1930.74	  Freud	  observed,	  “[I]t	  still	  strikes	  me	  myself	  as	  strange	  that	  the	  case	  histories	  I	  write	  should	  read	  like	  short	  stories	  and	  that,	  as	  one	  might	  say,	  they	  lack	  the	  serious	  stamp	  of	  science.	  I	  must	  console	  myself	  with	  the	  reflection	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  subject	  is	  evidently	  responsible	  for	  this,	  rather	  than	  any	  preference	  of	  my	  own.”75	  	  	  The	  last	  sentence	  of	  this	  quotation	  is	  particularly	  interesting:	  Freud	  not	  only	  recognized	  that	  case	  studies	  had	  scientific	  shortcomings	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  others;	  he	  considered	  these	  shortcomings	  to	  be	  intrinsic	  to	  psychoanalysis.	  There	  is	  no	  way	  to	  write	  a	  psychoanalytic	  case	  study,	  Freud	  implied,	  that	  is	  free	  of	  the	  subjective	  influence	  of	  the	  therapist.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  case	  study	  is	  to	  the	  therapist	  as	  the	  short	  story	  is	  to	  the	  fiction	  author;	  the	  creative	  role	  and	  talent	  (or	  idiosyncrasy)	  of	  the	  therapist	  cannot	  be	  divorced	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from	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  case	  study.	  On	  the	  inescapable	  influence	  of	  the	  individual	  therapist	  in	  psychoanalytic	  research,	  Horwitz	  writes:	  [H]ow	  could	  anyone	  be	  shown	  not	  to	  have	  an	  Oedipal	  complex	  when	  	   protestations	  that	  one	  had	  no	  such	  desires	  were	  taken	  as	  evidence	  of	  	  resistance	  to	  admitting	  its	  presence	  [Hale	  1995]?	  Freud,	  for	  example,	  	   interpreted	  his	  patients’	  refusal	  to	  accept	  his	  interpretations	  of	  their	  	   symptoms	  as	  confirmations	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  repression.76	  In	  short,	  the	  therapist-­‐as-­‐author	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  interpret	  anything	  the	  subject	  says	  or	  does,	  which	  allows	  the	  therapist	  to	  make	  the	  subject’s	  testimony	  fit	  the	  therapist’s	  overall	  narrative	  of	  the	  case	  study.	  Therefore,	  though	  Freud	  was	  rather	  dismissive	  of	  the	  literary	  rather	  than	  scientific	  appearance	  of	  the	  case	  study,	  attributing	  it	  not	  to	  his	  own	  talent	  as	  a	  writer	  but	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  psychoanalysis	  itself,	  it	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  quotation	  above	  (originally	  published	  in	  1895	  in	  Studies	  on	  Hysteria)	  that	  Freud	  did	  not	  anticipate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  allegations	  of	  not	  being	  scientific	  would	  eventually	  come	  to	  haunt	  psychoanalysis:	  by	  the	  criteria	  of	  scientific	  objectivity	  as	  it	  became	  conceptualized	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  case	  studies	  simply	  could	  not	  accurately	  represent	  their	  subjects,	  so	  the	  knowledge	  they	  produced—if	  they	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  produce	  any	  at	  all—could	  not	  be	  given	  the	  label	  “scientific.”	  	   The	  role	  of	  this	  apparent	  subjectivity	  in	  the	  decline	  of	  psychoanalysis	  is	  reflected	  by	  the	  difficulty	  of	  translating	  case	  studies	  into	  the	  cumulative	  knowledge	  that	  Stone	  felt	  psychoanalysis	  needed.	  Data	  gathered	  from	  surveys	  can	  be	  added	  to,	  and	  experiments	  can	  be	  replicated,	  but	  each	  case	  study	  is	  a	  standalone	  endeavor	  as	  unique	  as	  the	  individual	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subject.	  Furthermore,	  any	  psychoanalyst	  who	  wishes	  to	  “cross-­‐examine”	  the	  patient	  in	  another	  psychoanalyst’s	  case	  study	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  prevented	  due	  to	  confidentiality	  restrictions,	  and	  so	  even	  individual	  case	  studies	  are	  unable	  to	  be	  replicated	  or	  added	  to	  (except	  once	  they	  are	  published,	  when	  individual	  psychoanalysts	  can	  dispute	  interpretations	  or	  cite	  them	  as	  evidence	  for	  their	  own	  hypotheses).	  	  	   One	  important	  criterion	  for	  scientific	  objectivity	  that	  increasingly	  came	  into	  play	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century	  was	  that	  data	  gathered	  from	  separate	  studies	  should	  theoretically	  be	  consistent	  across	  studies,	  given	  certain	  conditions	  (e.g.	  the	  experiment	  is	  performed	  correctly,	  the	  sample	  size	  is	  large	  enough,	  etc.);	  that	  is,	  the	  experiment	  would	  be	  
reproducible.	  Reproducibility	  was	  increasingly	  considered	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  knowledge	  to	  count	  as	  “science.”	  In	  The	  Logic	  of	  Scientific	  Discovery,	  Karl	  Popper	  famously	  declared,	  “Non-­‐reproducible	  single	  occurrences	  are	  of	  no	  significance	  to	  science.”77	  In	  addition	  to	  its	  growing	  role	  as	  a	  criterion	  of	  objectivity,	  reproducibility	  also	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  repeating	  the	  inquiry	  with	  certain	  variations	  to	  explore	  a	  subject	  thoroughly.	  In	  short,	  reproducibility	  means	  that	  knowledge	  can	  be	  cumulative:	  because	  experiments	  can	  be	  repeated	  with	  everything	  held	  the	  same	  except	  a	  single	  manipulated	  variable,	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  the	  study	  can	  be	  relatively	  easily	  added	  to	  and	  integrated	  with	  previous	  knowledge	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  	   The	  ability	  of	  reproducibility	  to	  create	  cumulative	  knowledge	  did	  not	  work	  for	  the	  case	  study.	  The	  inescapable	  possibility	  that	  two	  psychoanalysts	  could	  draw	  two	  different	  conclusions	  from	  the	  same	  patient	  frustrated	  the	  possibility	  of	  reliably	  building	  upon	  the	  knowledge	  gained	  from	  a	  case	  study.	  Thus,	  despite	  Eissler’s	  claim	  for	  the	  fundamental	  role	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Karl	  R.	  Popper,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Scientific	  Discovery	  (London:	  Hutchinson,	  1959),	  203.	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of	  the	  case	  study	  in	  psychoanalysis’	  status	  as	  an	  empirical	  science,	  this	  method,	  unlike	  other	  research	  methods,	  was	  not	  useful	  to	  psychiatry	  in	  its	  quest	  for	  scientific	  legitimacy:	  the	  case	  study	  was	  incapable	  of	  producing	  a	  body	  of	  knowledge	  that	  met	  the	  criteria	  of	  being	  “scientific”	  according	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  era.	  	   In	  1982,	  the	  growing	  tension	  between	  the	  theoretical	  approach	  of	  psychoanalysis	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  drive	  toward	  objectivity	  and	  empiricism	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  science	  on	  the	  other	  culminated	  in	  a	  major	  public	  embarrassment	  for	  psychoanalysis:	  Rafael	  Osheroff’s	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  Chestnut	  Lodge.	  Osheroff,	  a	  42-­‐year-­‐old	  nephrologist	  from	  Virginia,	  was	  admitted	  to	  the	  psychoanalytically-­‐inclined	  Chestnut	  Lodge	  in	  Baltimore	  for	  severe	  depression	  in	  1979.	  During	  his	  seven-­‐month	  stay,	  Osheroff	  engaged	  in	  regular	  psychotherapy	  sessions,	  but,	  despite	  his	  requests	  and	  despite	  some	  success	  with	  medications	  prior	  to	  his	  admission	  to	  the	  Lodge,78	  he	  was	  denied	  medication.	  If	  Osheroff	  wanted	  to	  make	  genuine	  and	  permanent	  progress,	  his	  caretakers	  argued,	  he	  must	  regress	  to	  the	  point	  in	  his	  childhood	  from	  which	  his	  symptoms	  sprung;79	  relieving	  his	  symptoms	  with	  medications	  would,	  therefore,	  only	  impede	  progress.	  	   Dr.	  Osheroff’s	  life	  began	  to	  unravel.	  During	  his	  stay,	  he	  lost	  forty	  pounds,	  developed	  severe	  insomnia,80	  and	  his	  feet	  began	  to	  bleed	  from	  feverish	  pacing.81	  He	  eventually	  managed	  to	  transfer	  to	  another	  clinic,	  the	  Silver	  Hill	  Foundation,	  where	  he	  was	  given	  medication.	  His	  symptoms	  improved	  after	  three	  weeks,	  and	  he	  was	  discharged	  after	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Stepansky,	  9.	  	  79	  Shorter,	  309.	  80	  Stepansky,	  9.	  	  81	  David	  Healy,	  Let	  Them	  Eat	  Prozac:	  The	  Unhealthy	  Relationship	  between	  the	  
Pharmaceutical	  Industry	  and	  Depression	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  234.	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three	  months	  (with	  no	  relapse	  in	  the	  next	  decade).82	  However,	  the	  damage	  had	  been	  done:	  Osheroff	  returned	  home	  to	  find	  his	  wife	  had	  left	  him,	  he	  had	  lost	  custody	  of	  his	  children,	  and	  he	  had	  been	  forced	  out	  of	  his	  joint	  practice	  by	  his	  partner.	  	  	   Osheroff	  sued	  the	  Chestnut	  Lodge	  for	  malpractice	  in	  1982,	  claiming	  that,	  by	  being	  denied	  medications	  whose	  efficacy	  was	  well	  established	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  psychotherapeutic	  regime	  that,	  if	  anything,	  made	  him	  worse,	  he	  was	  denied	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  medical	  treatment.	  Osheroff	  was	  awarded	  $250,000	  by	  an	  arbitration	  panel,	  but	  both	  plaintiff	  and	  defendant	  appealed.	  Eventually	  a	  settlement	  for	  an	  undisclosed	  sum	  was	  agreed	  upon.83	  	   The	  Osheroff	  case	  certainly	  constituted	  a	  humiliating	  moment	  for	  psychoanalysis:	  it	  appeared	  that	  psychoanalysis	  was	  so	  ineffective	  in	  treatment	  of	  depression	  that	  its	  therapeutic	  failure	  had	  become	  a	  legal	  issue.	  Perhaps	  more	  significantly,	  though,	  the	  case	  seemed	  to	  highlight	  what	  many	  felt	  was	  an	  inescapable	  shortcoming	  of	  psychoanalysis:	  it	  simply	  did	  not	  subject	  itself	  to	  the	  new	  techniques	  of	  objectivity	  that	  other	  sciences	  were	  undergoing.	  In	  an	  article	  titled	  “The	  Psychiatric	  Patient’s	  Right	  to	  Effective	  Treatment”	  for	  the	  American	  Journal	  of	  Psychiatry,	  Gerald	  Klerman,	  a	  prominent	  Harvard	  psychiatrist	  who	  had	  testified	  on	  behalf	  of	  Osheroff,	  claimed:84	  With	  regard	  to	  all	  kinds	  of	  therapeutics…the	  most	  scientifically	  valid	  evidence	  as	  to	  the	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  of	  a	  treatment	  comes	  from	  randomized	  controlled	  trials	  when	  these	  are	  available.	  Although	  there	  may	  be	  other	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  Septansky,	  9.	  83	  Ibid.,	  10.	  	  84	  This	  article	  took	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  debate	  with	  Alan	  Stone	  in	  the	  same	  journal	  and	  issue,	  several	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  before	  Stone’s	  keynote	  address	  to	  the	  American	  Association	  of	  Psychoanalysis.	  See	  Alan	  A.	  Stone,	  “Law,	  Science,	  and	  Psychiatric	  Medicine:	  A	  Response	  to	  Klerman’s	  Indictment	  of	  Psychoanalytic	  Psychiatry,”	  American	  Journal	  of	  Psychiatry,	  147	  (1990):	  419-­‐427.	  
32	  
methods	  of	  generating	  evidence,	  such	  as	  naturalistic	  and	  follow-­‐up	  studies,	  the	  most	  convincing	  evidence	  comes	  from	  randomized	  controlled	  trials.85	  For	  Klerman	  and	  others,	  it	  was	  that	  simple:	  the	  best,	  most	  scientific	  kind	  of	  evidence	  was	  that	  which	  came	  from	  controlled	  trials,	  and	  controlled	  trials	  supported	  the	  efficacy	  of	  antidepressants	  while	  controlled	  trials	  supporting	  psychoanalysis	  were	  lacking;	  ergo,	  withholding	  medication	  from	  Osheroff	  was,	  objectively,	  the	  wrong	  choice.86	  	   Through	  the	  Chestnut	  Lodge	  trial,	  psychoanalysis	  suffered	  a	  major	  blow	  to	  its	  credibility	  with	  the	  public,	  within	  psychiatry,	  and	  with	  other	  physicians	  and	  scientists.87	  Though	  no	  legal	  precedent	  was	  set	  by	  the	  case,	  the	  result	  was	  that	  psychiatrists	  were	  given	  the	  impression	  that	  treating	  serious	  mental	  illness	  with	  psychoanalysis	  could	  potentially	  constitute	  malpractice.88	  More	  importantly,	  though,	  the	  Chestnut	  Lodge	  incident	  marked	  the	  climax	  of	  the	  growing	  pressure	  on	  psychoanalysis	  to	  be	  objective.	  The	  title	  of	  Klerman’s	  article	  (not	  to	  mention	  the	  fact	  that	  psychoanalysis’	  legal	  status	  was	  called	  into	  question)	  was	  just	  one	  part	  of	  a	  much	  broader	  trend	  in	  public	  and	  scientific	  opinion:	  psychoanalysis’	  lack	  of	  objectivity	  was	  not	  just	  unscientific—it	  was	  dangerous.	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  Treatment:	  Implications	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  Journal	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  (1990):	  412.	  	  86	  For	  a	  continued	  discussion	  of	  the	  Osheroff	  case	  and	  psychiatric	  authority,	  see	  Michael	  Robertson,	  “Power	  and	  knowledge	  in	  psychiatry	  and	  the	  troubling	  case	  of	  Dr	  Osheroff,”	  
Australian	  Psychiatry,	  13	  (2005):	  343-­‐350.	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  Robertson,	  347.	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CHAPTER	  3	  
The	  Rise	  of	  Diagnostic	  Psychiatry	  Dynamic	  psychiatry	  was	  not	  practiced	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  and	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  analyze	  how	  psychoanalysis	  disappeared	  from	  psychiatry	  without	  comparing	  psychoanalysis	  to	  competing	  ideologies	  and	  practices.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these	  competing	  ideologies	  was	  diagnostic	  psychiatry.	  As	  the	  name	  suggests,	  the	  shift	  to	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  consisted	  in	  a	  tremendous	  proliferation	  and	  utilization	  of	  medical	  diagnoses	  in	  psychiatry.	  Diagnoses	  had	  been	  used	  in	  American	  psychiatry	  for	  centuries,	  if	  only	  in	  categorizing	  the	  seriously	  ill	  patients	  in	  mental	  asylums.	  But	  the	  “diagnostic	  revolution”	  led	  to	  a	  tremendous	  increase	  in	  both	  the	  number	  and	  use	  of	  such	  diagnoses,	  such	  that	  there	  was	  an	  800%	  increase	  in	  psychiatric	  diagnoses	  in	  the	  last	  fifty	  years	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.89	  The	  possibilities	  created	  by	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  set	  of	  expansive	  but	  discrete	  diagnoses	  were	  too	  tempting	  for	  the	  discipline	  of	  psychiatry	  to	  ignore.	  Diagnostic	  psychiatry	  offered	  something	  that	  psychoanalysis	  could	  not—a	  way	  to	  organize	  and	  systemize	  (and,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  later,	  fund)	  the	  production	  of	  knowledge.	  	  Dynamic	  and	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  were,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  two	  models	  that	  contradicted	  each	  other.	  Diagnostic	  psychiatrists	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  use	  medications	  in	  treatment;	  dynamic	  psychiatrists,	  despite	  having	  medical	  training,	  preferred	  to	  use	  analysis	  and	  eschewed	  the	  pharmacological	  approach.90	  There	  was	  one	  similarity,	  however:	  both	  models	  treated	  domains	  of	  conditions	  that	  encompassed	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  behaviors	  and	  emotions.	  Mayes	  and	  Horwitz	  write,	  “By	  the	  1970s,	  the	  clients	  of	  dynamic	  psychiatrists	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Arthur	  C.	  Houts,	  “Fifty	  Years	  of	  Psychiatric	  Nomenclature:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  1943	  War	  Department	  Technical	  Bulletin,	  Medical	  203,”	  Journal	  of	  Clinical	  Psychology	  56(2000):	  935.	  90	  Jonathan	  Engel,	  American	  Therapy:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Psychotherapy	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Penguin	  Group	  Inc.:	  New	  York,	  2008),	  219.	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were	  people	  with	  poor	  marriages,	  troubled	  children,	  failed	  ambitions,	  general	  nervousness,	  and	  diffuse	  anxiety.”91	  Horwitz	  argues	  that	  the	  broad	  range	  of	  conditions	  treated	  by	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  was	  directly	  inherited	  from	  dynamic	  psychiatry.92	  That	  said,	  psychoanalysis	  as	  a	  theory	  did	  not	  neatly	  distinguish	  between	  the	  pathological	  and	  the	  normal	  in	  the	  way	  that	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  did;	  rather,	  the	  healthy	  and	  the	  neurotic	  were	  simply	  ends	  of	  a	  continuum.93	  	  Thus,	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  model	  in	  psychiatry	  constituted	  nothing	  less	  than	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  entirely	  new	  discourse,	  one	  that	  combined	  the	  implicit	  authority	  of	  a	  medical	  diagnosis	  with	  a	  framework	  for	  building	  up	  scientific	  knowledge	  in	  psychiatry.	  The	  Kuhnian	  model	  of	  scientific	  revolution	  proves	  useful	  in	  describing	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  change:	  the	  movement	  to	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  represents	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  American	  psychiatry.	  Horwitz	  writes:	  In	  Kuhn’s	  view,	  a	  transformation	  from	  one	  thought	  community	  to	  another	  rarely	  arises	  out	  of	  the	  development	  of	  new	  knowledge;	  instead,	  such	  change	  is	  only	  undertaken	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  a	  state	  of	  crisis	  in	  the	  previously	  dominant	  paradigm.	  The	  new	  model	  gains	  acceptance	  not	  so	  much	  because	  it	  more	  accurately	  characterizes	  the	  natural	  world	  as	  because	  it	  is	  better	  able	  to	  justify	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  the	  relevant	  discipline.94.	  This	  very	  accurately	  describes	  the	  case	  of	  the	  shift	  from	  psychodynamic	  to	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  in	  American	  psychiatry	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Rick	  Mayes	  and	  Allan	  V.	  Horwitz.	  “DSM-­‐III	  and	  the	  Revolution	  in	  the	  Classification	  of	  Mental	  Illness,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Behavioral	  Sciences	  41	  (2005):	  251.	  92	  Horwitz,	  2.	  93	  Ibid.,	  1.	  94	  Ibid.,	  57.	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I	  will	  argue	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  shift	  to	  the	  diagnosis	  in	  American	  psychiatry	  was	  not	  based	  on	  growing	  evidence	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  diagnosis,	  the	  medical	  model,	  or	  the	  understanding	  of	  mental	  suffering	  in	  terms	  of	  discrete	  illness	  analogous	  to	  biological	  illnesses;	  rather,	  the	  diagnosis	  became	  popular	  in	  American	  psychiatry	  because	  it	  addressed	  the	  perceived	  shortcomings	  of	  psychoanalysis.	  The	  “crisis	  in	  the	  previous	  dominant	  paradigm,”	  in	  the	  case	  of	  American	  dynamic	  psychiatry,	  was,	  in	  short,	  that	  psychoanalysis	  faced	  difficulties	  in	  meeting	  the	  sociocultural	  pressure	  to	  produce	  knowledge.	  The	  new	  model	  that	  was	  “better	  able	  to	  justify	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  the	  relevant	  discipline”	  was	  diagnostic	  psychiatry,	  which	  became	  popular	  because	  it	  enabled	  a	  more	  systemized	  (and	  hence	  more	  easily	  funded)	  way	  of	  studying	  mental	  distress.	  Before	  the	  tension	  between	  psychoanalysis	  and	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  can	  be	  examined,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  establish	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  diagnosis	  in	  American	  psychiatry.	  This	  history	  is	  most	  easily	  told	  through	  the	  creation	  and	  evolution	  of	  texts	  offering	  up	  diagnostic	  systems,	  in	  particular	  the	  Diagnostic	  and	  Statistical	  Manual	  of	  Mental	  
Disorders	  (DSM).	  The	  DSM,	  published	  by	  the	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  is	  a	  text	  containing	  a	  collection	  of	  mental	  illnesses	  and	  their	  diagnostic	  criteria.	  It	  has	  been	  published	  in	  several	  editions	  and	  revisions	  since	  the	  DSM’s	  first	  publication	  in	  1952	  (DSM-­‐I),	  with	  the	  DSM-­‐V	  being	  the	  most	  recent	  edition,	  released	  in	  May	  2013.	  	  There	  were	  attempts	  to	  establish	  classificatory	  systems	  well	  before	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  the	  DSM.	  One	  such	  attempt	  was	  the	  1918	  Statistical	  Manual	  for	  the	  use	  
of	  Institutions	  for	  the	  Insane,	  a	  joint	  effort	  by	  the	  American	  Medico-­‐Psychological	  Association	  (which	  later	  became	  the	  APA)	  and	  the	  National	  Committee	  for	  Mental	  Hygiene.	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The	  purpose	  of	  this	  manual	  was	  to	  standardize	  the	  data	  reports	  made	  annually	  by	  mental	  hospitals	  in	  the	  United	  States.95	  	  The	  publication	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐I	  was	  another	  significant	  step	  in	  the	  shift	  to	  diagnostic	  psychiatry.	  Published	  in	  1952,	  the	  DSM-­‐I	  was	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  large	  demand	  for	  and	  changing	  responsibilities	  of	  psychiatry	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  World	  War	  II;	  the	  demand	  on	  psychiatry	  to	  provide	  assessment	  and	  treatment	  of	  soldiers	  created	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  text	  like	  the	  DSM-­‐I.96	  Though	  containing	  an	  impressive	  106	  diagnoses,97	  the	  DSM-­‐I	  did	  not	  conflict	  with	  psychoanalysis	  in	  the	  way	  that	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  eventually	  did.	  In	  fact,	  the	  DSM-­‐I	  came	  out	  of	  a	  classificatory	  scheme	  called	  Medical	  203	  created	  for	  the	  Army	  by	  a	  prominent	  psychodynamic	  psychiatrist	  named	  William	  Menninger,	  and	  the	  DSM-­‐I	  is	  consequently	  highly	  inflected	  by	  psychodynamic	  thought.98	  	  The	  first	  revision	  of	  the	  DSM	  took	  the	  form	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐II,	  published	  in	  1968.	  The	  DSM-­‐II	  no	  longer	  characterized	  mental	  disorders	  using	  the	  psychoanalytic	  term	  “reaction”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  American	  Medico-­‐Psychological	  Association	  and	  the	  National	  Committee	  for	  Mental	  Hygiene,	  Statistical	  Manual	  for	  the	  use	  of	  Institutions	  for	  the	  Insane	  Prepared	  by	  the	  
Committee	  on	  Statistics	  of	  the	  American	  Medico-­Psychological	  Association	  in	  Collaboration	  
with	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  of	  the	  National	  Committee	  for	  Mental	  Hygiene	  (New	  York:	  1918),	  3-­‐4.	  96	  For	  a	  thorough	  assessment	  of	  the	  cultural	  and	  historical	  context	  in	  which	  the	  DSM-­‐I	  was	  created,	  see	  Gerald	  N.	  Grob,	  “Origins	  of	  DSM-­I:	  A	  Study	  in	  Appearance	  and	  Reality,”	  The	  
American	  Journal	  of	  Psychiatry	  148	  (1991):	  421-­‐431.	  97	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association.	  Diagnostic	  and	  statistical	  manual	  of	  mental	  disorders:	  
DSM-­I	  (Washington,	  DC:	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  1952).	  	  98	  Mitchell	  Wilson,	  in	  his	  “DSM-­‐III	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  American	  Psychiatry:	  A	  History,”	  writes,	  “The	  hegemony	  of	  the	  psychosocial	  theory	  in	  which	  individual	  psychological	  conflict	  and	  environmental	  circumstance	  collide	  to	  produce	  psychopathology,	  was	  nowhere	  better	  exemplified	  than	  in	  DSM-­‐I…”	  (401).	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(although	  it	  retained	  the	  term	  “neurosis”)99,	  but	  like	  its	  predecessor,	  it	  reflected	  the	  psychodynamic	  thought	  dominant	  in	  American	  psychiatry	  at	  that	  time.100	  The	  turning	  point	  of	  the	  “diagnostic	  revolution,”	  is	  widely	  held	  to	  be	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐III	  in	  1980.101,102	  Similar	  to	  its	  predecessors	  but	  larger	  in	  scope,	  the	  DSM-­‐III	  was	  at	  least	  partially	  a	  reaction	  to	  growing	  concerns	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  countries	  were	  diagnosing	  mental	  disorders	  in	  different	  ways—it	  seemed,	  for	  example,	  that	  English	  psychiatrists	  diagnosed	  bipolar	  disorder	  significantly	  more	  often,	  and	  schizophrenia	  significantly	  less	  often,	  than	  American	  psychiatrists.103	  This	  seemed	  at	  least	  partially	  due	  to	  the	  disproportionate	  influence	  of	  psychoanalysis	  in	  American	  psychiatry	  compared	  with	  other	  countries	  at	  this	  time.104	  This	  led	  to	  increased	  pressure	  for	  standardizing	  diagnostic	  criteria	  internationally.	  The	  DSM-­‐III	  was	  published	  in	  1980	  and	  contained	  265	  diagnoses.105	  	  
Table	  1.	  Expansion	  of	  DSM.	  Reproduced	  from	  Rick	  Mayes	  and	  Allan	  V.	  Horwitz.	  “DSM-­‐III	  and	  the	  Revolution	  in	  the	  Classification	  of	  Mental	  Illness,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Behavioral	  Sciences.	  41	  (Summer	  2005):	  249–267.	  	  Version	   	   Year	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Total	  Number	  of	  Diagnoses	   	  	  	  	  Total	  Number	  of	  Pages	  	  	  I	   	   	   1952	   	   	   106	   	   	   	   130	  II	   	   	   1968	   	   	   182	   	   	   	   134	  III	   	   	   1980	   	   	   265	   	   	   	   494	  III-­‐R	   	   	   1987	   	   	   292	   	   	   	   567	  IV	   	   	   1994	   	   	   297	   	   	   	   886	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Houts,	  947.	  100	  Mayes	  and	  Horwitz,	  249–267.	  101	  Wilson,	  399-­‐410.	  102	  Mayes	  and	  Horwitz,	  249-­‐267.	  103	  See,	  for	  example,	  Ronald	  Gelfand	  and	  Frank	  Kline,	  “Differences	  in	  Diagnostic	  Patterns	  in	  Britain	  and	  America,”	  Comprehensive	  Psychiatry	  19	  (1978):	  551-­‐555.	  	  104	  Ibid.,	  552.	  105	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association.	  Diagnostic	  and	  statistical	  manual	  of	  mental	  disorders:	  
DSM-­III	  (Washington,	  DC:	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  1980).	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It	  was	  in	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐III	  that	  the	  conflict	  between	  dynamic	  and	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  reached	  its	  apex.	  Despite	  being	  created	  by	  a	  committee	  chaired	  by	  Robert	  Spitzer,	  a	  psychiatrist	  with	  dynamic	  leanings,	  the	  DSM-­‐III,	  unlike	  the	  DSM-­‐I	  or	  DSM–II,	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  incorporate	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  almost	  at	  all.106The	  DSM-­‐III	  created	  its	  own	  problems	  for	  psychiatry—it	  was	  widely	  criticized	  for	  pathologizing	  normal	  human	  behaviors,	  such	  as	  tobacco	  dependence	  and	  poor	  attention	  span	  in	  children107(in	  a	  2007	  interview,	  Spitzer	  himself	  estimated	  that,	  after	  the	  DSM-­‐III	  was	  published,	  20	  or	  30	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  were	  misdiagnosed	  as	  having	  a	  mental	  disorder108).	  However,	  the	  shift	  to	  the	  diagnostic	  model,	  despite	  the	  issues	  in	  public	  relations	  it	  presented,	  proved	  beneficial	  for	  psychiatry’s	  authority	  on	  the	  whole.	  The	  rigorous	  laying	  out	  of	  specific	  criteria	  in	  the	  various	  editions	  of	  the	  DSM	  and	  its	  precursors	  was	  a	  direct	  attempt	  to	  standardize	  the	  classification	  of	  mental	  distress,	  and	  thereby	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  posed	  to	  research	  by	  the	  psychoanalyst’s	  subjectivity	  that	  are	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  	   The	  clash	  between	  the	  psychoanalytic	  community	  and	  the	  creators	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐III	  was,	  in	  fact,	  strongly	  symbolic	  of	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  dynamic	  to	  the	  diagnostic	  perspective	  as	  a	  whole.	  Despite	  critiques	  that	  it	  neither	  added	  anything	  new	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  mental	  illness	  nor	  correctly	  represented	  its	  nature,	  the	  diagnostic	  perspective	  prevailed	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  implicit	  scientific	  authority.	  Classificatory	  systems,	  though	  a	  tool	  of	  “objective”	  science,	  are	  not	  always	  innocent,	  as	  Foucault	  established	  in	  The	  Order	  of	  Things,	  nor	  are	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they	  free	  from	  subjectivity:	  Gerald	  Grob,	  for	  one,	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  development	  of	  psychiatric	  nosology,	  writes:	  Classification	  systems	  are	  neither	  inherently	  self-­‐evident	  nor	  given.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  emerge	  from	  the	  crucible	  of	  human	  experience;	  change	  and	  variability,	  not	  immutability,	  are	  characteristic.	  Indeed,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  data	  are	  organized	  at	  various	  times	  reflect	  specific	  historical	  circumstances.	  Empirical	  data,	  after	  all,	  can	  be	  presented	  and	  analyzed	  in	  endless	  varieties	  of	  ways.109	  Though	  the	  objectivity	  of	  classificatory	  systems	  is	  itself	  unreliable,	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  it	  was	  viewed	  as	  objective,	  and	  therefore	  psychiatry	  was	  able	  to	  ground	  its	  authority	  in	  a	  classificatory	  model,	  like	  the	  rest	  of	  biology	  and	  medicine.	  	  Revisiting	  the	  Kuhnian	  approach	  to	  the	  shift	  to	  the	  diagnostic	  model,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  the	  underlying	  social	  pressures	  predicted	  by	  Kuhn’s	  model:	  the	  movement	  to	  classification	  greatly	  augmented	  the	  scientific	  credibility	  of	  psychiatry	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  complement	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  scientific	  change	  is	  motivated	  by	  social	  factors,	  though,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  motivated	  by	  scientific	  developments.	  This	  is	  demonstrably	  true	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐III.	  The	  DSM-­‐III	  caused	  controversy	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  but	  particularly	  for	  its	  alleged	  emphasis	  on	  reliability	  (that	  is,	  defining	  diagnoses	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  multiple	  psychiatrists	  would	  diagnose	  the	  same	  patient	  the	  same	  way)	  over	  validity	  (defining	  diagnoses	  to	  actually	  describe	  the	  mental	  illness	  as	  accurately	  as	  possible)—in	  short,	  an	  emphasis	  on	  consistent	  diagnosis	  rather	  than	  meaningful	  diagnosis.	  Creating	  and	  defining	  mental	  illnesses	  in	  a	  way	  that	  prioritized	  reliable	  diagnosis	  became	  a	  priority	  of	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the	  creators	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐III;110	  Decker	  says	  simply,	  “For	  Spitzer,	  reliability	  trumped	  validity.”111	  Perhaps	  unsurprisingly,	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  “reliability	  versus	  validity”	  debate	  were	  the	  dynamic	  psychiatrists.112These	  psychoanalytically	  trained	  psychiatrists	  commonly	  complained	  that	  the	  deliberately	  “atheoretical”	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  creators	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐III	  in	  the	  name	  of	  objectivity	  completely	  eschewed	  the	  etiological	  insights	  offered	  by	  the	  psychodynamic	  perspective,	  which	  was	  still	  the	  dominant	  view	  in	  psychiatry	  at	  that	  time.113	  Many	  psychoanalysts	  felt	  that	  this	  snub	  was	  inherent	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  project,	  as	  neither	  classification	  nor	  diagnosis	  had	  strong	  roots	  or	  obvious	  usefulness	  in	  psychoanalysis.	  (Freud	  himself	  rejected	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  mental	  illness,	  in	  part	  because	  he	  felt	  that	  such	  a	  system	  could	  only	  offer	  a	  superficial	  understanding	  of	  mental	  distress,	  and	  that	  this	  would	  directly	  inhibit	  psychoanalysis’	  ability	  to	  explain	  a	  patient	  comprehensively,	  and	  partly	  because	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  held,	  at	  its	  core,	  the	  belief	  that	  each	  individual	  subject	  was	  unique.114)	  Like	  the	  growth	  of	  classification	  in	  psychiatry,	  the	  relative	  emphasis	  on	  reliability	  over	  validity	  represented	  a	  conscious	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  to	  display	  objectivity	  and	  empiricism,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  its	  diagnoses	  were	  accurate	  or	  beneficial:	  while	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  diagnoses	  might	  be	  hard	  to	  assess,	  their	  reliability	  could	  be	  easily	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measured	  (and	  they	  were,	  with	  encouraging	  results115).	  True,	  just	  because	  the	  diagnoses	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐III	  were	  reliable	  did	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  they	  were	  valid.	  But	  with	  proving	  the	  validity	  of	  its	  diagnoses	  once	  and	  for	  all	  an	  ambitious	  and	  monumentally	  difficult	  project,	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  gained	  credibility	  for	  itself	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  could:	  it	  established	  that	  its	  diagnoses	  were	  reliable.	  Proving	  reliability	  did	  not	  prove	  validity,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  establishing	  social	  legitimacy,	  it	  was	  nearly	  as	  useful.	  First,	  it	  gave	  the	  diagnoses	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  psychiatry	  the	  appearance	  of	  internal	  coherency.	  Second,	  though	  reliability	  does	  not	  entail	  validity,	  it	  is	  logical	  that	  validity	  entails	  reliability.116	  Therefore,	  the	  DSM-­‐III’s	  reliability	  seemed	  to	  suggest,	  at	  least	  superficially,	  that	  the	  diagnostic	  model	  met	  the	  prerequisites	  for	  validity	  in	  a	  way	  that	  psychoanalysis	  did	  not—this	  reliability	  in	  diagnosis,	  after	  all,	  is	  directly	  analogous	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  reproducibility	  that,	  as	  I	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  was	  nearly	  impossible	  in	  dynamic	  psychiatry	  and	  increasingly	  becoming	  a	  fundamental	  criterion	  for	  the	  scientific	  objectivity	  of	  knowledge.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  “reliability	  versus	  validity”	  debate	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  classificatory	  system	  propounded	  by	  the	  DSM-­‐III	  was	  motivated	  more	  by	  social	  pressures	  than	  new	  discoveries	  in	  science,	  just	  as	  Kuhn	  described.	  	  Certain	  growing	  demands	  on	  psychiatric	  research	  also	  facilitated	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  dynamic	  to	  the	  diagnostic	  model.	  The	  rise	  of	  partial	  reimbursement	  for	  psychotherapy	  by	  medical	  insurance	  companies	  during	  the	  1960s	  added	  further	  pressure	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  “categorical,	  rather	  than	  continuous,	  model	  of	  illness.”117	  Medical	  insurance	  plans	  paid,	  on	  average,	  one	  quarter	  of	  outpatient	  psychotherapy	  treatment;	  this	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proportion	  grew	  steadily	  throughout	  the	  1970s,	  and	  the	  insurers	  grew	  to	  include	  Medicaid.118	  Insurance	  companies	  required	  that	  treatment	  effectiveness	  have	  some	  way	  of	  being	  objectively	  assessed.	  Mayes	  and	  Horwitz	  write:	  To	  objectively	  determine	  what	  the	  optimal	  treatment	  was	  for	  a	  given	  mental	  disorder,	  the	  critics	  called	  for	  new	  and	  stringent	  standards	  for	  demonstrating	  effectiveness,	  such	  as	  those	  used	  by	  the	  FDA	  to	  test	  the	  efficacy	  of	  drugs:	  quantitative	  and	  comparative	  studies	  based	  on	  matched	  samples	  of	  patients	  uniformly	  diagnosed,	  randomly	  assigned,	  and	  treated	  with	  standardized	  procedures,	  with	  outcomes	  judged	  not	  only	  by	  clinicians	  but	  by	  impartial	  observers	  not	  involved	  in	  the	  treatment.119	  The	  economic	  pressures	  of	  third-­‐party	  payers	  to	  formalize	  the	  study	  of	  mental	  distress	  necessitated	  the	  creation	  of	  discrete	  mental	  illnesses	  with	  specific	  criteria	  delineated	  in	  a	  text	  agreed	  upon	  by	  consensus	  (i.e.	  the	  DSM	  or	  International	  Classification	  of	  Diseases	  [ICD],	  the	  international	  equivalent	  of	  the	  DSM).	  It	  is	  inaccurate	  to	  characterize	  the	  shift	  to	  the	  diagnostic	  model	  as	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  greed,	  because	  the	  market	  for	  psychotherapy,	  including	  psychoanalysis,	  was	  “lucrative	  and	  growing”	  at	  this	  time.120But	  it	  would	  be	  equally	  inaccurate	  to	  ignore	  the	  financial	  incentives	  for	  shifting	  to	  the	  new	  diagnostic	  paradigm.	  Though	  the	  continuous	  nature	  of	  neuroses	  according	  to	  the	  dynamic	  model	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  nearly	  anyone	  to	  be	  a	  patient,	  the	  sheer	  number	  and	  variety	  of	  mental	  illnesses	  in	  the	  diagnostic	  model	  ensured	  there	  would	  be	  no	  dearth	  of	  patients	  in	  that	  model	  either.	  More	  importantly,	  though,	  while	  the	  practice	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Ibid.	  119	  Mayes	  and	  Horwitz,	  256.	  120	  Horwitz,	  59.	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of	  psychiatry	  may	  still	  have	  been	  lucrative	  under	  the	  dynamic	  model,	  research	  thrived	  best	  under	  the	  funding	  enabled	  by	  the	  classificatory	  diagnostic	  model.	  The	  founding	  of	  the	  National	  Institute	  of	  Mental	  Health	  (NIMH)	  in	  1946	  was	  an	  important	  moment	  for	  psychiatry,	  as	  it	  became	  an	  important	  source	  of	  funding	  for	  mental	  health	  research	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Initially	  focused	  on	  providing	  mental	  health	  services	  for	  communities	  across	  the	  nation,	  during	  the	  1970s	  growing	  pressure	  from	  research	  psychiatrists	  (and,	  Horwitz	  suggests,	  an	  increasingly	  conservative	  Congress	  that	  opposed	  the	  “sweeping	  social	  agendas”	  of	  the	  NIMH’s	  community	  centers121)	  led	  to	  a	  gradual	  shift	  in	  focus	  and	  funding	  to	  the	  research	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  entities	  of	  the	  DSM.	  It	  was	  fundamentally	  this	  advantage	  that	  led	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  model	  of	  psychiatry:	  the	  classification	  of	  mental	  distress	  enabled	  more	  organized	  and	  (seemingly,	  at	  least)	  more	  empirical	  research.	  This	  organization	  and	  empiricism	  seem	  to	  lend	  classificatory	  systems	  like	  taxonomy	  and	  nosology	  an	  implicit	  authority	  as	  a	  scientific	  endeavor;	  Hannah	  Decker,	  in	  her	  account	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐III’s	  creation,	  states,	  “Classification	  is	  a	  necessary	  endeavor	  that	  human	  beings	  automatically	  carry	  out	  from	  early	  infancy	  on	  in	  order	  to	  comprehend	  the	  world	  they	  live	  in.”122	  Though	  whether	  a	  tendency	  toward	  classification	  is	  an	  essential	  characteristic	  of	  human	  nature	  is	  certainly	  up	  for	  debate,	  Decker	  does	  manage	  to	  convey	  the	  historical	  significance	  of	  classification	  as	  a	  scientific	  technique.	  It	  is	  classification’s	  implicit	  authority	  that	  gave	  the	  field	  of	  psychiatry,	  when	  it	  shifted	  to	  the	  diagnostic	  model,	  both	  an	  immediate	  boost	  in	  credibility	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  the	  means	  by	  which	  to	  create	  and	  organize	  new	  scientific	  knowledge:	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Ibid.,	  77.	  	  122	  Decker,	  129.	  See	  also	  Geoffrey	  C.	  Bowker	  and	  Susan	  Leigh	  Star,	  Sorting	  Things	  Out:	  
Classification	  and	  its	  Consequences	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  MIT	  Press,	  1999).	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creation	  of	  a	  system	  of	  distinct	  diseases	  allowed	  mental	  distress	  to	  be	  defined	  and	  rendered	  researchable	  by	  modern	  scientific	  methods.123As	  Grob	  puts	  it,	  “In	  modern	  medicine,	  as	  in	  modern	  society,	  classification	  systems	  play	  a	  crucial	  role,	  for	  without	  such	  systems	  the	  collection	  and	  analysis	  of	  data	  are	  all	  but	  impossible.”124	  And	  this,	  more	  than	  lucrative	  psychotherapy	  sessions,	  was	  what	  psychiatry	  needed;	  psychotherapy	  could,	  in	  theory,	  be	  practiced	  without	  a	  medical	  degree,	  but	  in	  order	  for	  psychiatry	  to	  maintain	  its	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  science	  and	  branch	  of	  medicine,	  it	  needed	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  produce	  knowledge.	  Thus,	  the	  shift	  to	  the	  diagnostic	  model	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  motivated	  by	  certain	  political	  pressures	  on	  psychiatry,	  from	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  discipline,	  to	  develop	  new	  ways	  of	  producing	  scientific	  knowledge.	  This,	  in	  short,	  is	  why	  psychiatry	  rejected	  psychoanalysis	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century:	  psychiatry	  found	  itself	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  culture	  where	  psychiatry’s	  adherence	  to	  psychoanalysis	  jeopardized	  its	  existence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Horwitz,	  58.	  124	  Grob,	  421.	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CONCLUSION	  
Between	  Society	  and	  Science	  	   I	  am	  a	  pre-­‐medical	  student,	  and	  when	  my	  fellow	  pre-­‐med	  students	  find	  out	  I	  am	  concentrating	  in	  English,	  the	  second	  thing	  they	  say	  is	  a	  question:	  why	  did	  I	  choose	  a	  degree	  so	  different	  from	  my	  career	  aspirations?	  I	  always	  tell	  them	  the	  same	  thing:	  Nothing	  happens	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  Science	  does	  not	  happen	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  and	  medicine	  certainly	  does	  not	  happen	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  I	  study	  society	  and	  culture	  not	  in	  spite	  of	  my	  medical	  ambitions,	  but	  because	  of	  them.	  This	  response	  is	  satisfactory	  to	  my	  fellow	  English	  majors,	  but	  my	  pre-­‐med	  friends	  tend	  to	  get	  even	  more	  confused.	  I	  believe	  this	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  first	  thing	  they	  usually	  say	  when	  they	  find	  out	  I’m	  an	  English	  major:	  “Oh,	  I	  could	  never	  do	  that!	  I’m	  no	  good	  at	  that	  subjective	  stuff.	  I	  prefer	  science	  and	  math,	  where	  there	  are	  right	  and	  wrong	  answers.”	  	   To	  many,	  science	  and	  medicine	  are	  havens	  of	  objectivity	  and	  empiricism.	  For	  these	  people,	  the	  idea	  that	  society,	  politics,	  and	  culture	  could	  pervade	  the	  sanctity	  of	  these	  havens	  is	  entirely	  unheard	  of.	  Yet,	  this	  is	  undoubtedly	  the	  case—even	  if	  the	  objects	  of	  study	  themselves	  are	  indifferent	  to	  human	  society,	  the	  way	  that	  we	  study	  them	  is	  not.	  How	  do	  we	  define	  what	  counts	  as	  “science?”	  Does	  it	  matter?	  When	  is	  something	  empirical?	  Are	  non-­‐empirical	  research	  methods	  to	  be	  discounted	  entirely?	  What	  are	  the	  societal	  implications	  of	  scientific	  discoveries?	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  undeniable	  example	  of	  the	  inevitable	  mingling	  of	  society	  and	  scientific	  research	  is	  the	  question	  of	  what	  gets	  researched.125	  And	  this	  question	  is	  in	  part	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Complementarily,	  the	  question	  is	  often	  who	  gets	  researched.	  See	  Steven	  Epstein,	  
Inclusion:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Difference	  in	  Medical	  Research	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2007).	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answered	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  “publish-­‐or-­‐perish:”	  that	  is,	  the	  institutional	  pressure	  on	  researchers	  and	  academics	  to	  produce	  knowledge	  in	  quantity	  even	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  quality—and,	  implicitly,	  to	  do	  so	  without	  questioning	  the	  definition	  of	  knowledge.126	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  apply	  the	  concept	  of	  publish-­‐or-­‐perish	  not	  just	  to	  a	  single	  researcher	  or	  laboratory,	  but	  an	  entire	  discipline.	  Psychiatry’s	  abandonment	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  I	  have	  argued,	  was	  essentially	  due	  to	  psychoanalysis’	  failure	  to	  produce	  knowledge,	  or	  at	  least	  knowledge	  considered	  “scientific.”	  The	  diagnostic	  model	  performed	  extremely	  well	  in	  this	  regard,	  and	  it	  is	  mostly	  due	  to	  this	  that	  we	  now	  operate	  under	  the	  diagnostic	  model	  rather	  than	  the	  dynamic.	  In	  his	  book	  Impure	  Science:	  AIDS,	  Activism,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Knowledge,	  Steven	  Epstein	  analyzes	  the	  example	  of	  protesters	  from	  ACT	  UP	  (the	  AIDS	  Coalition	  to	  Unleash	  Power)	  demonstrating	  outside	  Harvard	  Medical	  School	  on	  the	  first	  day	  of	  classes	  in	  fall	  1988.	  The	  protesters	  passed	  out	  fliers	  for	  an	  “AIDS	  101”	  course	  with	  an	  outline	  of	  topics	  like,	  “AZT—Why	  does	  it	  consume	  90	  percent	  of	  all	  research	  when	  it’s	  highly	  toxic	  and	  is	  not	  a	  cure?”	  and	  “Medical	  elitism—Is	  the	  pursuit	  of	  elegant	  science	  leading	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  our	  community?”	  Epstein	  writes,	  “These	  protesters	  were	  not	  rejecting	  medical	  science.	  They	  were,	  however,	  denouncing	  some	  variety	  of	  scientific	  practice—‘elegant’	  science,	  ‘what	  Harvard	  calls	  “good	  science”—as	  not	  conducive	  to	  medical	  progress	  and	  the	  health	  and	  welfare	  of	  their	  constituency.”127	  That	  is,	  the	  chemical	  properties	  and	  clinical	  efficacy	  of	  AZT	  might	  not	  be	  a	  social	  construction,	  but	  how	  the	  research	  gets	  carried	  out,	  and	  whether	  it	  gets	  carried	  out	  at	  all,	  certainly	  is	  determined	  by	  society.	  Thus,	  understanding	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Ushma	  S.	  Neil,	  “Publish	  or	  perish,	  but	  at	  what	  cost?”,	  Nature	  467	  (2010):	  252.	  127	  Steven	  Epstein,	  Impure	  Science:	  AIDS,	  Activism,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Knowledge	  (Berkeley	  and	  Los	  Angeles:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1996),	  2.	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intersection	  of	  society	  and	  science	  is	  indispensible	  to	  anyone	  interested	  in	  practicing	  science	  and	  medicine.	  	  To	  understand	  better	  the	  social	  politics	  underlying	  our	  concepts	  of	  mental	  illness,	  biological	  illness,	  and	  medicine	  more	  generally	  is	  ultimately	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  diagnostic	  model	  is	  one	  way	  of	  organizing	  and	  understanding	  mental	  illness;	  it	  has	  its	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages,	  and	  may	  certainly	  be	  more	  useful	  to	  particular	  ends	  than	  other	  models,	  but	  ultimately,	  the	  discrete	  mental	  illnesses	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  model	  are	  still	  just	  tools	  that	  we	  use	  to	  understand	  the	  same	  phenomena	  (e.g.	  sadness,	  anxiety,	  etc.)	  that	  Freud	  was	  attempting	  to	  explain	  through	  psychoanalysis.	  Furthermore,	  as	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  concept	  of	  objectivity	  in	  science	  has	  changed	  over	  time;	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  a	  social	  construction,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  has	  changed	  even	  as	  recently	  as	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century	  implies	  that	  our	  current	  conception	  of	  objectivity—or,	  at	  least,	  our	  supposedly	  objective	  practices	  and	  techniques—are	  still	  flawed	  or	  incomplete.	  Thus,	  scientists	  and	  medical	  professionals	  who	  acknowledge	  this	  may	  gain	  perspective	  in	  their	  own	  research	  and	  practice.	  	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  science	  and	  medicine	  is	  indifferent	  to	  societal	  factors,	  science	  and	  medicine	  are	  both	  conducted	  in	  a	  social	  and	  political	  world.	  Paul	  Starr,	  in	  The	  Social	  Transformation	  of	  American	  Medicine,	  writes,	  “[Physicians]	  serve	  as	  intermediaries	  between	  science	  and	  private	  experience,	  interpreting	  personal	  troubles	  in	  the	  abstract	  language	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.”128	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  then	  science	  is	  only	  half	  of	  the	  equation;	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  job,	  physicians	  must	  familiarize	  themselves	  with	  both	  the	  social	  origins	  and	  social	  consequences	  of	  the	  scientific	  knowledge	  they	  utilize.	  In	  this	  way,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Paul	  Starr,	  The	  Social	  Transformation	  of	  American	  Medicine	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  Inc.,	  1982),	  4.	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my	  analysis	  of	  the	  death	  of	  psychoanalysis	  in	  American	  psychiatry	  is	  more	  or	  less	  my	  extremely	  long	  response	  to	  those	  pre-­‐med	  friends	  who	  are	  confused	  about	  why	  I	  majored	  in	  English.	  To	  borrow	  a	  term	  from	  medicine,	  this	  thesis	  is	  an	  autopsy—a	  case	  study	  of	  an	  organism	  that	  is	  now	  dead,	  performed	  in	  order	  that	  we	  might	  better	  understand	  what	  is	  still	  alive.	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